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In this dissertation, we explore how to improve scalability of blockchains
while maintaining their fundamental premise of decentralization. Scalable
blockchains are capable of delivering a target throughput and latency in the
presence of increasing workload. To this end, first we present Bitcoin-NG, a
new blockchain protocol designed to provide scale for services involving fre-
quent, high-volume interactions. This Byzantine fault tolerant blockchain pro-
tocol is robust to extreme churn and shares the same trust model as Bitcoin.
We experimentally demonstrate that Bitcoin-NG scales optimally, with band-
width limited only by the capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited
only by the propagation time of the network. Then, we examine the scalabil-
ity challenges arising from proliferation of blockchain services. In particular,
we observe that due to inherently single-service oriented blockchain protocols,
services can bloat the existing blockchains, fail to provide sufficient security, or
completely forego the property of trustless auditability. We introduce Aspen,
a sharded blockchain protocol that securely scales with increasing number of
services. Aspen enables service integration without compromising security —
leveraging the trust assumptions — or flooding users with irrelevant messages.
Finally, we provide the means to assess the viability of different scaling solu-
tions. We develop and utilize custom metrics for evaluating performance and
security of blockchain protocols. Moreover, we design tools and techniques for
measuring decentralization in operational blockchain systems, demonstrating
their use in a comparative study of decentralization in Bitcoin and Ethereum.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has recently emerged with a promise to streamline in-
teractions in a wide range of settings. Exploring this potential has had a broad
impact on different interest groups. Less than a decade after their inception,
blockchains have attracted hundreds of companies from different circles and
catalyzed the formation of many consortia [43], raised close to $1.8B in venture
capital [42], and created cryptocurrency markets with total capitalization close
to $100B [45]. Similarly, governments have been actively examining and en-
couraging the use of blockchains in the public sector [94, 57, 161, 93]. Academic
interest towards the study of blockchains has steadily grown [125, 39].
The key driving force behind the interest in blockchains is decentralization
of power among entities with minimal trust relationships. Traditional, non-
blockchain-based systems tend to incorporate control in trusted third parties,
such as international organizations, governments, and authorized middlemen –
e.g. notaries and certificate authorities. Contrary to such conventional design
practices, blockchain-based systems inherently provide independently verifi-
able guarantees, obviating the need to rely on centralized authorities. The lack
of a central authority enables blockchain services to provide stronger safety and
liveness properties for distributed systems. Because there is no central authority
in control, corrupting a blockchain or hampering the propagation of its contents
are possible only through collusion among powerful entities. Consequently,
blockchain services can achieve higher resistance against tampering and cen-
sorship, even in the presence of malicious insiders.
Growing adoption of blockchains for services that are traditionally provided
by nation states or large corporations, such as money and digital asset manage-
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ment, has raised new challenges. In particular, a critical task in this context is to
provide the level of scalability required to achieve a target throughput and la-
tency in the presence of increasing workload, without compromising the decen-
tralized nature of blockchains. But as of today, the most prominent blockchain
instantiation to date, Bitcoin [131], achieves only 3.3 transactions per second, in-
curs 10-minute expected latencies for transaction serialization with longer rec-
ommended waiting times for deciding on transaction status, and consumes over
50 GB of additional disk space per year. There is a big gap between the current
and the desired level of scalability to enable novel applications or to compete
with centralized services.
If blockchains are indeed going to be a globally disruptive technology, they
have to scale. This dissertation describes our work towards improving the scal-
ability of blockchain technologies. To this end, we first devise a new protocol
for scaling on-chain. This protocol preserves all of the standard assumptions of
Bitcoin-like blockchains, and allows them to sidestep their fundamental scala-
bility bottleneck: block propagation. Then we examine a more aggressive sce-
nario, where the same blockchain hosts multiple different services. We propose
an approach that scales with differing asset types without commingling them
on a single main chain. Finally, we present a comparative empirical study of
the leading blockchain-based cryptocurrencies with the largest market capital-
ization and user base, Bitcoin and Ethereum [66].
1.1 The Rise of Blockchains
To illustrate the need for scalability, this section presents a representative list of
compelling blockchain services that have been proposed.
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Digital Money. Blockchain technology emerged as the underlying infrastruc-
ture of a decentralized global currency, called Bitcoin. Following Bitcoin’s lead,
hundreds of alternative blockchain-based currencies have been created [167],
most sharing the same consensus mechanism as Bitcoin, differing only in pro-
tocol parameters.
Blockchain-based currencies have enabled cheap international remittance
and pseudonymous online payments without middlemen. These currencies are,
first and foremost, payment systems that act as a medium of exchange. They have
gained widespread adoption in underground economies [124], and received
recognition as legal tenders from governments [101, 172]. The value brought
on by their role as a medium of exchange has allowed them to serve as a store
of value for others. However, most such currencies are still in their infancy as a
unit of account. The current practice involves conversion from some other unit of
account, such as USD, to a blockchain-based currency at the time of purchase.
As more of the economy moves into use such currencies, goods and services
could possibly be priced in them.
Smart Contracts. A smart contract is a program that enables users to imple-
ment their own autonomous execution logic on blockchains [66, 103, 58]. In
particular, they enable pseudonymous parties to establish complex agreements
that are enforced by a network of independent entities. Smart contract appli-
cations include prediction markets [8, 88], supply chain tracking [152], flight
insurance [175], and legally binding agreements [41].
Micropayments. Small online payments, known as micropayments, are not fea-
sible in traditional payment systems, mainly due to high transaction fees [138].
Off-chain transaction protocols aim to minimize this cost. Proposed protocols
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establish direct payment channels between users, and use blockchains for con-
flict resolution and settlement [91, 55, 141]. Recent work has leveraged trusted
execution environments to secure such payment channels [112].
Healthcare. Ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability of electronic
health records (EHR) have been critical for the healthcare industry [15, 79]. The
centralization of medical records raises concerns about security and interoper-
ability of patient data. Proposed services aim to integrate this information on
blockchains to reduce healthcare costs, enhance data privacy, improve the qual-
ity of care, and provide tamper-resistant record keeping [173, 90, 63, 123].
Digital Asset Management. Digital assets are intangible properties typically
representing tokens of value such as stocks, bonds, securities, and custom cur-
rencies. Services for managing such assets can be either layered on top of ex-
isting open blockchains [46, 50], or integrated to custom blockchains containing
only the approved participants with role-based permissions [36]. Such services
promise to improve the integrity of bookkeeping.
Intellectual Property Tracking. Intellectual property (IP) represents creative
works based on original thought such as photos, music, or pieces of litera-
ture. IP owners possess rights to receive financial return from their creation.
Blockchain services [18, 109, 134] can issue certificates of ownership for digital
works and facilitate the compensation of IP owners such as artists, songwriters,
and publishers.
Land Record and Deed Maintenance. People in many parts of the world do
not have legal title to their assets. This makes the sale or purchase of such assets
challenging. Blockchain-based services promise to store land and deed records
4
to create an adequate knowledge base, facilitate electronic land transactions,
and reduce property rights registration costs [150, 16].
Global Name Registration. Naming systems, such as domain name resolu-
tion services and public key infrastructures, associate human-readable names
with owner-specified data. Such systems are traditionally centralized, raising
concerns regarding censorship and seizure of names. Decentralized blockchain
naming services [115, 2, 26] can address these concerns.
File Storage. Centralized cloud storage services require implicit trust from
users regarding the availability, privacy, and integrity of their data. To alleviate
these concerns, storage-oriented blockchain services aim to distribute encrypted
shards of user data among multiple administrative domains [169, 80].
Supply Chain Management. Supply chain management refers to tracking the
movement of goods and information. But, this process often involves a lot of pa-
perwork that is open to tampering [142]. Detailed record keeping on blockchain
promises to reduce insurance and auditing costs, enable better conformity to
company standards regarding the source of goods and labor, and expedite iden-
tification of missing or damaged shipments. Ongoing work explores the use of
blockchains for cross-industry supply chains [56].
Online Voting. Secret ballots typically provide confidentiality, but fail to as-
sure integrity. Blockchain-based voting services enable voters to confirm that
their votes have been counted while preserving their privacy [81, 122]. More-
over, a convenient voting process potentially improves voter turnout.
All these services are incredibly demanding in terms of the frequency and
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volume of interactions. Full appreciation of these services requires significant
scalability. This dissertation represents a step towards achieving this goal.
1.2 Goals and Challenges in Scaling Blockchains
Blockchain scalability corresponds to the capability of achieving a target
throughput and latency in the presence of increasing workload, without un-
dermining the central tenet of decentralization that makes blockchains com-
pelling at the first place. This section presents the goals and challenges in scaling
blockchain technology.
Scaling blockchains while retaining their decentralization is critical to realize
their potential. Scalable blockchains promise to (1) enable services that achieve
comparable performance as mainstream technologies, (2) support novel appli-
cations, such as e-commerce based on machine-to-machine microtransactions,
and (3) support a large number of users, including citizens of nation states or
customers of large corporations.
1.2.1 Goals
Unfortunately, existing blockchain applications are far from satisfying the scal-
ability requirements to compete with centralized systems. Current mainstream
payment processors, such as Visa, supports orders of magnitude higher peak
transaction throughput and incurs much lower latency compared to the opera-
tional Bitcoin platform [52].
The first crucial metric for scaling blockchains is the maximum through-
put. This metric represents the upper bound at which a blockchain can pro-
cess requests. In Bitcoin-derived blockchain protocols, this bound corresponds
6
to transaction confirmation rate. A transaction cannot be confirmed until it re-
sides in a block. Hence, this rate is primarily constrained by the maximum size
and frequency of blocks that bundle transactions. A high maximum throughput
enables a blockchain service to perform more work in a given time.
The second metric for scaling blockchains is the consensus latency. This met-
ric indicates the delay for transaction confirmation. A low consensus latency
provides high confidence that a transition has occurred; hence, it prevents long
waiting times to ensure steady blockchain state.
1.2.2 Challenges
Establishing a certain level of decentralization is the core premise of
blockchains. The maintenance of this premise depends on keeping resource use
in check, because different administrative entities can benefit from blockchain
services only if they can satisfy the corresponding requirements. In particular,
while increasing the maximum size and frequency of blocks would improve the
peak throughput and latency of a service, suboptimal reparametrization leads to
concentration of power under few participants with greater resources. It should
be noted that, even without any reparametrization, resource consumption of
such services continuously grows due to the append-only nature of blockchains.
Resource management primarily concerns the following functions:
Storing. The preservation of the blockchain state to ensure its availability.
In existing blockchain protocols, state typically represents the entire history.
Hence, user nodes require adequate storage space, as well as disk throughput
and latency.
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Processing. The execution of operations for maintenance of blockchain ser-
vices. These CPU-intensive operations include the validation of transactions,
invocation of smart contracts, and extension of the blockchain.
Propagation. The transmission of blockchain components, such as transac-
tions and blocks, to other participants. Propagation performance depends on
network latency and transmission capacity – i.e. provisioned bandwidth.
1.3 Contributions
This dissertation broadly explores how to improve scalability of blockchains
while preserving their decentralized nature.
Bitcoin-derived blockchain protocols exhibit an inherent tradeoff between
throughput and consensus latency. We outline a scalable blockchain protocol
that preserves the trust assumptions of Bitcoin, yet shifts this tradeoff to achieve
a significantly higher throughput with a fraction of Bitcoin’s latency. To illus-
trate the scalability improvements of this protocol, a comparative assessment
is critical. But quantitative evaluation of the security and performance of such
consensus protocols is challenging. To achieve this goal, we introduce special-
ized metrics for systematic evaluation of blockchain protocols. These metrics
enable assessing the performance and security of protocols with regard to their
consensus latency, goodput, robustness against centralization, and rollback-
resistance. We demonstrate the scalability and robustness of our proposed pro-
tocol on an evaluation testbed at 15% the size of the operational Bitcoin network
at the time of our setup. We built and calibrated this testbed using our measure-
ments from the actual network.
The proliferation of blockchain services, either on common or separate
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blockchains, presents another scalability challenge. We observe that services
on dedicated blockchains suffer from lack of mining power to secure their in-
frastructures; hence, this makes them open to all kinds of attacks. In contrast,
combining all services in a single blockchain bloats the system and increases re-
source requirements. Users of such systems store, process, and propagate data
of all blockchain services, regardless of the services they are interested in. We
propose a novel service-oriented technique for sharding blockchains that can
reduce resource requirements and bootstrap time, secure the entire blockchain
with an unfragmented mining power, and provide network and trust construc-
tion similar to Bitcoin. This technique also illustrates a principled approach to
facilitate the process of introducing services and updating the existing ones. We
instantiate this technique in a blockchain protocol that accelerates access to rel-
evant user services.
While blockchain-based systems derive their value from being decentral-
ized, there have been few quantitative studies on the extent to which existing
systems achieve this goal in practice. We present a global-scale empirical study
of the decentralization of blockchain-based currencies with the largest market
share and user community, Bitcoin and Ethereum. We introduce tools and tech-
niques for measuring blockchain-based cryptocurrency networks through re-
trieval of unique data. Using these tools and techniques, we deploy a measure-
ment system that has been collecting data over a 12 month time frame across five
continents. We observe that while the Bitcoin platform offers more resource ca-
pacity, greater censorship resistance, less overhead under high churn, and more
diverse mining power distribution, Ethereum provides better fairness with re-
gard to miner revenue and less divergence in network link latency. Based on
our observations, we provide concrete suggestions for improving both systems.
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1.4 Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the
background, including how blockchain protocols work. Chapter 3 presents
Bitcoin-NG, a blockchain protocol that achieves high transaction throughput
with low consensus latency. Chapter 4 specifies a secure sharding technique for
blockchains, and shows application of it on Aspen, a blockchain protocol that
scales with increasing number of services. Chapter 5 presents a comparative
and longitudinal assessment of decentralization in the two leading blockchain-
based platforms, Bitcoin and Ethereum. Chapter 6 surveys the related work,
and Chapter 7 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
A blockchain is a global append-only log that can serve as a shared database
with an immutable record of all transactions. A consensus mechanism enables
this log to be distributed securely, and cryptographic techniques ensure that
transactions can be submitted solely by those in possession of the appropriate
keys.
This chapter presents the relevant background on blockchain technology, in-
cluding how the corresponding protocols work. In particular, it describes proto-
cols of the two leading blockchain-based cryptocurrencies with the largest mar-
ket capitalization and user base, Bitcoin [131] and Ethereum [66].
2.1 Blockchain Protocols
Blockchain protocols have been used to achieve consensus in large scale peer-to-
peer net- works with open participation. Because anyone can join the network,
the underlying protocols need to be robust against Byzantine behaviors by par-
ticipants. To achieve this, they specify a set of communication rules that en-
force the integration and validity of building blocks comprising the underlying
blockchain. In particular, they define the size, frequency, and format constraints
for blocks and transactions with which participants may extend the blockchain.
Blockchains record transactions in units of blocks. Each block includes a unique
ID, and IDs of the preceding valid blocks. The determination of such preceding
blocks varies based on the particular blockchain protocol.
To account for the lack of a central authority to oversee the blockchain ex-
tension process, protocols depend on a distributed consensus mechanism that
ensures global agreement on the state. The majority of existing blockchain pro-
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tocols, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, currently employ a proof of work mech-
anism to achieve this goal [86].
In proof of work, generating a block requires a participant, called a miner,
to conduct some computationally intensive task to produce a result that is easy
to verify by others – i.e. a solution to a cryptopuzzle. This process is called
mining, and, by slight abuse of terminology, we refer to the creation of blocks as
block mining. Miners are incentivized to invest their resources to generate blocks.
In particular, the mining process enables participants to extend the blockchain
proportional to their computational power. This provides resistance against
Sybil attacks [60]. Ongoing research explores more efficient and environmen-
tally friendly alternatives [144, 17, 7, 35, 96].
2.1.1 Fork
Achieving Internet-scale consensus is challenging. While the first block of the
blockchain, called the genesis block, is hard coded in the protocol specification,
the others are not. This enables any peer with a valid block to extend the
blockchain by simply publishing it over an overlay network to all other peers.
Hence, during the execution of the protocol, the local state of peers might differ.
Such disagreements in the global blockchain state are called forks. A fork in-
dicates that participants have extended some common prefix of the blockchain
with different blocks, leading to multiple branches. Other participants may sub-
sequently add new valid blocks to any of these branches. In protocols that adopt
proof of work mechanism, when a miner tries to add a new block after an ex-
isting block, we say she mines on the existing block. If this block is a leaf of a
branch, we say she mines on the branch.
To resolve forks, a blockchain protocol prescribes the branch that partici-
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pants should pick as the extension of the main chain – e.g. the one with the
most mining power to generate. Branches and blocks outside the main chain
are called pruned – some refer to such branches or blocks as orphans, though
this usage is technically incorrect, because they have a parent. Transactions in
pruned blocks are considered as invalid until a participant serializes them in a
valid block within the main chain. A transaction can be placed in the main chain
at any later time, unless a contradicting one, e.g. another transaction spending
the same outputs, was placed there in the meantime. The formation of forks is
undesirable, as they indicate that there is no globally-agreed blockchain state.
2.1.2 Nakamoto Consensus
Nakamoto consensus [20, 22, 23, 131, 28] is a decentralized consensus protocol
that is implicitly defined and implemented in Bitcoin. This protocol, named
after its pseudonymous inventor, enables participants to reach an agreement on
the global state of a blockchain. This section provides a specification of this core
protocol.
Our definition of Nakamoto Consensus is similar to that of Garay et al. [82].
The system consists of a set of nodes N that are connected by a reliable
peer-to-peer network. The nodes are to implement a replicated state machine
(RSM) [107, 149]. The properties of Nakamoto consensus are as follows:
Termination. There exists a time difference function ∆(·) such that, given a time
t and a value 0 < ε < 1, the probability is smaller than ε that at times
t′, t′′ > t + ∆(ε) a node returns two different states for the machine at
time t.
Agreement. There exists a time difference function ∆(·) such that, given a 0 <
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ε < 1, the probability that at time t two nodes return different states for
t−∆(ε) is smaller than ε.
Validity. At a given time t, a subset of nodes B(t) ⊂ N are Byzantine and be-
have arbitrarily, controlled by a single adversary. If the fraction of mining
power of such Byzantine nodes is bounded by f , i.e., ∀t :
∑
b∈B(t)m(b)∑
n∈N m(n)
< f ,
then the average fraction of state machine transitions that are not inputs
of honest nodes is smaller than f .
2.2 Bitcoin and Ethereum
Bitcoin and Ethereum are decentralized cryptocurrencies based on blockchain
protocols that employ Nakamoto consensus to regulate transaction serialization
in their platforms. In each of these cryptocurrencies, a replicated state machine
maintains the balances of the different users, and its transitions are transactions
that move funds among them. These state machines are managed by miners.
While the two systems are architecturally very similar, they differ substan-
tially in terms of their abstractions. The rest of this section presents the relevant
details of the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchain protocols.
2.2.1 The Bitcoin Protocol
Bitcoin protocol uses transactions primarily to represent exchange of funds be-
tween users. These funds are specified in terms of the Bitcoin currency. A typical
Bitcoin transaction contains a set of inputs, outputs, and scripts to specify the
sources, destinations, and validity conditions of fund transfers, respectively.
Each user commands addresses, and sends Bitcoins by forming a transaction
from her address to another’s address and propagating it to the nodes. More
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explicitly, a transaction is from the output of a previous transaction to a specific
address. Bitcoin is based on a UTXO (unspent transaction outputs) model. This
model considers an output as spent if a transaction input in the blockchain refers
to it; hence, the total unspent output values of a peer represents her funds. A
user owns x Bitcoins at time t if the aggregate of unspent outputs to its address
is x. Transactions are protected with cryptographic techniques that ensure only
the rightful owner of a Bitcoin address can transfer funds from it. Miners accept
transactions and commit them into the blockchain only if their sources have not
been spent, thereby preventing users from double-spending their funds.
Transactions reside in blocks of a global main chain, which is identified as
the one with the most accumulated proof of work. Miners extend this chain
by building on each others’ blocks; thus, they can benefit from being physically
close to each other. The wire protocol is based on flooding block and transaction
announcements, followed by pull requests from peers that are missing them.
This avoids sending the same information redundantly to peers across multiple
overlay hops. Each transaction is validated at least twice – i.e. upon receiving
them and within discovered blocks.
A valid block contains (1) a solution to a cryptopuzzle involving the hash of
the previous block, (2) the hash (specifically, the Merkle root) of the transactions
in the current block, which have to be valid, and (3) a special transaction, called
the coinbase, crediting the miner with the reward for solving the cryptopuzzle.
The specific cryptopuzzle is a double-hash of the block header whose result
has to be smaller than a set value. The problem difficulty, set by this value, is
dynamically adjusted such that blocks are generated at an average rate hard
coded into the protocol.
The fundamental protocol parameters are block size and frequency. The pro-
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tocol targets a 10 minute block interval with a maximum size limit of 1 MB.
At the time of our measurements, the latest 100 blocks were generated with a
0.99 MB median block size and a 9.8 minute average interval.
When a miner creates a block, she is compensated for her efforts with Bit-
coins. This compensation includes a per-transaction fee paid by the users whose
transactions are included, as well as an amount of new Bitcoins that did not exist
before.
Block dissemination over the Bitcoin overlay network takes seconds,
whereas the average mining interval takes minutes. Therefore, accidental bi-
furcation occurs on average about once every 60 blocks [54]. In case of such
forks, the criterion for the winning chain is to be the heaviest one, that is, the one
that required (in expectancy) the most mining power to generate. All miners
add blocks to the heaviest chain of which they know, with random tie-breaking.
We note that choosing a longest branch at random is suggested by Eyal and
Sirer [77]. The operational client currently chooses the first branch it has heard
of, making it more vulnerable in the general case. The heaviest chain a node
knows is the serialization of RSM inputs it knows, and hence describes the
RSM’s state.
2.2.2 The Ethereum Protocol
Ethereum protocol focuses on providing a platform to facilitate the process
of building decentralized applications on its blockchain. In this platform, the
blockchain stores smart contracts written in an integrated programming lan-
guage that enable users to implement their own autonomous execution logic.
To achieve this goal, it adopts a design inspired by both Nakamoto consensus
and the GHOST protocol [154].
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The key insight in the GHOST protocol is to adopt a chain selection rule
to harness the residual mining power over pruned blocks for improved secu-
rity. Ethereum protocol relies on the chain selection rule of Nakamoto consen-
sus [86], but it benefits from the pruned blocks in different ways [171]. The
protocol includes such blocks, called uncles in Ethereum nomenclature, in its
blockchain and rewards the corresponding miners with the intent of making the
system more decentralized. While uncles do not directly contribute to the secu-
rity of the chain, rewarding their miners conceivably prevents well-connected
mining entities from uniting under a single administrative domain by incen-
tivizing independent block generation. In particular, uncle rewards enable
Ethereum to afford more ambitious design choices – e.g. high block frequency.
Finally, inclusion of uncles in the blockchain provides better transparency for
tracking miner activities; hence, it facilitates the detection of fluctuations in min-
ing power utilization.
Ethereum has a block interval between 10 to 20 seconds [86]. The block
size is indirectly determined by an execution and storage fee, called gas. Each
user operation, such as adding two numbers or storing a byte, has an associ-
ated cost represented by a fixed amount of gas. With every transaction, the
sender specifies a gas price she is willing to pay in terms of the native token of
Ethereum, called Ether. Hence, the fee for a transaction is calculating by mul-
tiplying its total gas consumption by this user-specified exchange rate. Conse-
quently, Ethereum miners are compensated for their efforts with the sum of all
such transaction fees in their blocks. Each such block specifies a limit for the
maximum amount of gas that its transactions can cumulatively consume. This
limit helps keeping the block size in check, providing protection against forks
due to increased block propagation and processing times. Contrary to Bitcoin’s
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maximum block size, miners dynamically adjust this limit for each block. At the
time of our measurements, the latest 100 blocks were generated with a 2.9 KB
median block size and a 16.3 second average interval.
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CHAPTER 3
BITCOIN-NG: A SCALABLE BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOL
Despite their potential, blockchain protocols face a significant scalability bar-
rier [153, 111, 55, 12]. The maximum rate at which these systems can process
transactions is capped by the choice of two parameters: block size and block
interval. Increasing block size improves throughput, but the resulting bigger
blocks take longer to propagate in the network. Reducing the block interval
reduces latency, but leads to instability where the system is in disagreement
and the blockchain is subject to reorganization. Bitcoin currently targets a con-
servative 10 minutes between blocks, yielding 10-minute expected latencies for
transactions to be encoded in the blockchain. The block size is currently set
at 1MB, yielding only 1 to 3.5 transactions per second for Bitcoin for typical
transaction sizes. Proposals for increasing the block size are the topic of heated
debate within the Bitcoin community [140].
In this chapter, we present Bitcoin-NG, a scalable blockchain protocol, based
on the same trust model as Bitcoin. Bitcoin-NG’s latency is limited only by the
propagation delay of the network, and its bandwidth is limited only by the pro-
cessing capacity of the individual nodes. Bitcoin-NG achieves this performance
improvement by decoupling Bitcoin’s blockchain operation into two planes:
leader election and transaction serialization. It divides time into epochs, where each
epoch has a single leader. As in Bitcoin, leader election is performed randomly
and infrequently. Once a leader is chosen, it is entitled to serialize transactions
unilaterally until a new leader is chosen, marking the end of the former’s epoch.
While this approach is a significant departure from Bitcoin’s operation,
Bitcoin-NG maintains Bitcoin’s security properties. Implicitly, leader election
is already taking place in Bitcoin. But in Bitcoin, the leader is in charge of serial-
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izing history, making the entire duration of time between leader elections a long
system freeze. In contrast, leader election in Bitcoin-NG is forward-looking, and
ensures that the system is able to continually process transactions.
Evaluating the performance and functionality of new consensus protocols is
a challenging task. To help perform this quantitatively and provide a founda-
tion for the comparison of alternative consensus protocols, we introduce several
metrics to evaluate implementations of Nakamoto consensus. These metrics
capture performance metrics such as protocol goodput and latency, as well as
various aspects of its security, including its ability to maintain consensus and
resist centralization.
We evaluate the performance of Bitcoin-NG on a large emulation testbed
consisting of 1000 nodes, amounting to over 15% of the current operational Bit-
coin network [129]. This testbed enables us to run unchanged clients, using real-
istic Internet latencies. We compare Bitcoin-NG with the original Bitcoin client,
and demonstrate the critical tradeoffs inherent in the original Bitcoin protocol.
Controlling for network bandwidth, reducing Bitcoin’s latency by decreasing
the block interval and improving its throughput by increasing the block size
both yield adverse effects. In particular, fairness suffers, giving large miners an
advantage over small miners. This anomaly leads to centralization, where the
mining power tends to be concentrated under a single controller, breaking the
basic premise of the decentralized cryptocurrency vision. Additionally, min-
ing power is lost, making the system more vulnerable to attacks. In contrast,
Bitcoin-NG improves latency and throughput to the maximum allowed by net-
work conditions and node processing limits, while avoiding the fairness and
mining power utilization problems.
In summary, this chapter makes three contributions. First, it outlines the
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Bitcoin-NG scalable blockchain protocol, which achieves significantly higher
throughput and lower latency than Bitcoin while maintaining the Bitcoin
trust assumptions. Second, it introduces quantitative metrics for evaluating
Nakamoto consensus protocols. These metrics are designed to ground the ongo-
ing discussion over parameter selection in Bitcoin-derived currency. Finally, it
quantifies, through large-scale experiments, Bitcoin-NG’s robustness and scala-
bility.
3.1 Model and Goal
As in Bitcoin [131] and enhancements thereof [66, 153, 111], the goal of Bitcoin-
NG is to implement a replicated state machine (RSM) in an open system. The
exact assumptions and guarantees are explored in different works [28, 128, 82].
Our model is similar to those of Aspnes et al. [5] and Garay et al. [82]. These
are different from the model and goal of classical Byzantine fault tolerant RSMs.
The latter, by and large, (1) assume static or slow-to-change membership, allow-
ing for quorum systems and reconfigurations thereof, and (2) do not guarantee
fairness of representation of honest parties in the state machine transitions.
The system is comprised of a set of nodesN connected by a reliable peer-to-
peer network. Each node can poll a random oracle [14] as a random bit source.
Nodes can generate key-pairs, but there is no trusted public key infrastructure.
The system employs a cryptopuzzle system, defined by a cryptographic hash
function H . The solution to a puzzle defined by the string y is a string x such
that H(y|x) — the hash of the concatenation of the two — is smaller than some
target. Each node i has a limited amount of compute power, called mining power,
measured by the number of potential puzzle solutions it can try per second. A
solution to a puzzle constitutes a proof of work, as it statistically indicates the
21
amount of work a node had to perform in order to find it.
At any time t, a subset of nodesB(t) ⊂ N are Byzantine and behave arbitrar-
ily, controlled by a single adversary. The other nodes are honest — they abide by
the protocol. The mining power of each node i is m(i). The mining power of the
Byzantine nodes is less than 1/4 of the total compute power at any given time:
∀t :
∑
b∈B(t)
m(b) <
1
4
∑
n∈N
m(n)
because proof-of-work blockchains, Bitcoin-NG included, are vulnerable to self-
ish mining by attackers larger than 1/4 of the network [77].
3.2 Bitcoin-NG
Bitcoin-NG is a blockchain protocol that serializes transactions, much like Bit-
coin, but allows for better latency and bandwidth without sacrificing other
properties.
The protocol divides time into epochs. In each epoch, a single leader is in
charge of serializing state machine transitions. To facilitate state propagation,
leaders generate blocks. The protocol introduces two types of blocks: key blocks
for leader election and microblocks that contain the ledger entries. Each block has
a header that contains, among other fields, the unique reference of its predeces-
sor; namely, a cryptographic hash of the predecessor header.
We detail the operation of the protocol in this section and explain its incen-
tive system in Section 3.3.
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3.2.1 Leader Election and Key Blocks
The problem of leader election was apparently first formulated and solved
in 1977 by Gerard LeLann [108]. In 1982, Hector Garcia-Molina addressed the
problem in a distributed system that admits failures [83]. Since then leader elec-
tion has been extensively used to improve the performance of distributed sys-
tems (e.g., [61, 130]). In these classical consensus protocols, the leader’s role is
to propose decisions that have to be confirmed by a quorum. This can be com-
pared to blockchain protocols where the block of a leader (as defined here) is
confirmed in retrospect by subsequent blocks of subsequent leaders.
In Bitcoin-NG, key blocks are used to choose a leader. Like a Bitcoin block, a
key block contains the reference to the previous block (either a key block or a mi-
croblock, usually the latter), the current Unix time, a coinbase transaction to pay
out the reward, a target value, and a nonce field containing arbitrary bits. As in
Bitcoin, for a key block to be valid, the cryptographic hash of its header must be
smaller than the target value. Unlike Bitcoin, a key block contains a public key,
whose corresponding signature identifies the valid subsequent microblocks. In
Bitcoin-NG, a leader is a miner that holds the private key associated with the
public key in the latest key block. This private key is independent of a miner’s
communication endpoint; hence, a leader is not tied to a particular IP address.
As in Bitcoin, for a miner to generate a key block, it must iterate through
nonce values until the cryptopuzzle condition is met. Consequently, the interval
between consecutive key blocks is exponentially distributed. To maintain a set
average rate, the difficulty is adjusted by deterministically changing the target
value based on the Unix time in the key block headers.
In case of a fork, just as in Bitcoin, the nodes pick the branch with the most
work, aggregated over all key blocks, with random tie breaking.
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the Bitcoin-NG chain. Microblocks (circles) are signed
with the private key matching the public key in the last key block (squares). Fee
is distributed 40% to the leader and 60% to the next one.
3.2.2 Microblocks
Once a node generates a key block it becomes the leader. As a leader, the node
is allowed to generate microblocks at a set rate smaller than a predefined max-
imum. The maximum rate is deterministic, and can be much higher than the
average interval between key blocks. The size of microblocks is bounded by a
predefined maximum. Specifically, if the timestamp of a microblock is in the
future, or if its difference with its predecessor’s timestamp is smaller than the
minimum, then the microblock is invalid. This bound prohibits a leader (mali-
cious, greedy, or broken) from swamping the system with microblocks.
A microblock contains ledger entries and a header. The header contains the
reference to the previous block, the current Unix time, a cryptographic hash of
its ledger entries, and a cryptographic signature of the header. The signature
uses the private key that matches the public key in the latest key block in the
chain. For a microblock to be valid, all its entries must be valid according to the
specification of the state machine, and the signature has to be valid. Figure 3.1
illustrates the structure.
Note that microblocks do not affect the weight of the chain, as they do not
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Figure 3.2: When microblocks are frequent, short forks occur on almost every
leader switch.
contain proof of work. This is critical for keeping the incentives aligned, as
explained in Section 3.3.
3.2.3 Confirmation Time
When a miner generates a key block, he may not have heard of all microblocks
generated by the previous leader. If microblock generation is frequent, this can
be the common case on leader switching. The result is a short microblock fork,
as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Such a fork is observed by any node that receives
the to-be-pruned microblock (blocksA3 andA4 in the figure) before the new key
block (block B in the figure). It is resolved once the key block propagates to that
node. Therefore, a user that sees a microblock should wait for the propagation
time of the network before considering it in the chain, to make sure it is not
pruned by a new key block.
3.2.4 Remuneration
To motivate mining, a leader is compensated for her efforts by the protocol.
Remuneration is comprised of two parts. First, each key block entitles its gen-
erator a set amount. Second, each ledger entry carries a fee. This fee is split by
the leader that places this entry in a microblock, and the subsequent leader that
generates the next key block. Specifically, the current leader earns 40% of the
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fee, and the subsequent leader earns 60% of the fee, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The choice of this distribution is explained in Section 3.3.
In practice, the remuneration is implemented by having each key block con-
tain a single coinbase transaction that mints new coins and deposits the funds
to the current and previous leaders. As in Bitcoin, this transaction can only be
spent after a maturity period of 100 key blocks, to avoid non-mergeable trans-
actions following a fork.
3.2.5 Microblock Fork Prevention
Since microblocks do not require mining, they can be generated cheaply and
quickly by the leader, allowing it to split the brain of the system, publishing
different replicated-state-machine states to different machines. This allows for
double spending attacks, where different nodes believe the same coins were
spent with different transactions.
To demotivate such behavior, we use a dedicated ledger entry that inval-
idates the revenue of fraudulent leaders. Past work has used such entries in
different contexts [74, 11, 32]. In Bitcoin-NG, the entry is called a poison transac-
tion, and it contains the header of the first block in the pruned branch as a proof
of fraud. The poison transaction has to be placed on the blockchain within the
maturity window of the misbehaving leader’s key block, and before the revenue
is spent by the malicious leader. Besides invalidating the compensation sent to
the leader that generated the fork, a poison transaction grants the current leader
a fraction of that compensation, e.g., 5%. The choice of this value is explained in
Section 3.3.
Only one poison transaction can be placed per cheater, even if the cheater
creates many forks. The cheater’s revenue that is not relayed to the poisoner is
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lost.
3.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we first explain the incentive system of Bitcoin-NG. Then we
explore the other concerns regarding the security of Bitcoin-NG, including its
censorship resistance, resilience to variations in mining power, key block and
microblock forks, double spending, and wallet security.
3.3.1 Incentives
This section describes how miners with capacity smaller than 1/4 of the total
network are incentivized to follow the protocol. Specifically, miners are mo-
tivated to (1) extend the heaviest chain, (2) include transactions in their mi-
croblocks, and (3) extend the longest chain. Unlike in Bitcoin, the heaviest and
the longest chains are not identical.
Heaviest Chain Extension. The motivation for extending the heaviest chain
is the same as in Bitcoin. Since the honest majority will extend the heaviest
chain, it will remain the main chain with high probability. A dishonest majority
may arbitrarily switch to any branch and win [105]. A minority choosing to
mine on another branch will not catch up with an honest majority, therefore it
will mine on the main chain to ensure its revenues. We therefore argue that the
guarantees of Bitcoin-NG are similar to those of Bitcoin [128] with respect to the
Termination and Agreement properties of Nakamoto consensus.
Microblocks carry no weight, not even as a secondary index. If they did,
it would increase the system’s vulnerability to selfish mining [76, 132, 148]. In
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Figure 3.3: Attacks based on hiding microblocks. Shading indicates blocks gen-
erated by a specific miner. An honest miner publishes her microblock (case 1),
but she may (case 1.1) or may not (case 1.2) generate the subsequent key block.
The fraction of transaction fees that goes to the preceding miner should be large
enough to prevent her from performing attacks by hiding microblocks (case 2
and 3).
selfish mining, an attacker withholds blocks it has mined and publishes them
judiciously to obtain a superior presence in the main chain. If microblocks car-
ried weight, an attacker could keep secret microblocks and gain advantage by
mining on microblocks unpublished to anyone else.
We conclude that Bitcoin-NG does not introduce a new vulnerability to self-
ish mining strategies, and so Bitcoin-NG is resilient to selfish mining against
attackers with less than 1/4 of the mining power. We therefore argue that the
guarantees of Bitcoin-NG are similar to those of Bitcoin with respect to the va-
lidity property of Nakamoto consensus.
Transaction Inclusion. A leader collects 40% of a transaction’s revenue by
placing it in a microblock, and may earn the remaining revenue if she succeeds
in mining the subsequent key block. However, she could potentially improve
her revenue by secretly trying to earn 100% of the fee. To do so, first, the leader
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Figure 3.4: Attacks based on ignoring microblocks. Shading indicates blocks
generated by a specific miner. An honest miner generates a key block on the
latest microblock that she knows of (case 1). Whereas an attacker (case 2) that
ignores microblocks may (case 2.1) or may not (case 2.2) obtain 100% of the
transaction fees. The fraction of transaction fees that goes to the subsequent
miner should be large enough to prevent such attacks.
creates a microblock with the transaction, but does not publish it. Then, she
tries to mine on top of this secret microblock, while other miners mine on older
microblocks. If the leader succeeds in mining the subsequent key block, she ob-
tains 100% of the transaction fees. Otherwise, she waits until the transaction is
placed in a microblock by another miner and tries to mine on top of it. Figure 3.3
illustrates these cases.
Consider a miner whose mining power ratio out of all mining power in the
system is α. Denote by rleader the revenue of the leader from a transaction, leav-
ing (1 − rleader) for the next miner. In Bitcoin-NG, we have rleader = 40%. The
value of rleader has to be such that the average revenue of a miner trying the
above attack is smaller than her revenue placing the transaction in a public mi-
croblock as it should:
Win 100%︷ ︸︸ ︷
α× 100% +
Lose 100%, but mine after txn︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α)× α× (100%− rleader) < rleader +(1−α)×0+α× (1−rleader) ,
therefore rleader > α1+α . Assuming the power of an attacker is bounded by 1/4 of
the mining power, we obtain rleader > 20%, hence rleader = 40% is within range.
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Longest Chain Extension. A miner collects 60% of a serialized transaction’s
revenue if she mines the subsequent key block following the microblock chain
containing this transaction. But to increase her revenue from a transaction, a
miner could avoid the transaction’s microblock and mine on a previous block.
Then he would place the transaction in its own microblock and try mining the
subsequent key block. Figure 3.4 illustrates these cases. A miner’s revenue in
the malicious case must be smaller than her revenue by mining on the transac-
tion’s microblock as prescribed:
Place in
microblock︷ ︸︸ ︷
rleader +
Mine next
key block︷ ︸︸ ︷
α(100%− rleader) <
Mine on existing
microblock︷ ︸︸ ︷
100%− rleader ,
therefore rleader < 1−α2−α . Assuming the power of an attacker is bounded by 1/4
of the mining power, we obtain rleader < 43%, hence rleader = 40% is within range.
Optimal Network Assumption. Incentive compatibility cannot be maintained
in Bitcoin-NG for an attacker larger than about 29%. For larger attackers, the in-
tersection of the two conditions is empty. But this limit does not come into play
in the general case, where Bitcoin-NG, like Nakamoto’s blockchain with ran-
dom tie breaking [77], are secure only against attackers smaller than 23.2% [148]
due to selfish mining attacks.
However, under optimal network assumptions, Bitcoin’s blockchain is more
resilient than Bitcoin-NG: Assuming a zero latency network where an attacker
cannot rush messages — i.e., receive a message and send its own such that other
nodes receive the attacker’s message before the original one — Bitcoin is be-
lieved to be secure against selfish mining attackers of size up to almost 1/3.
Bypassing Fee Distribution. We note that a user can circumvent the 40− 60%
transaction fee distribution by paying no transaction fee, and instead paying
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the current leader directly, using the coinbase address of the leader’s key block.
However, a user does not gain a significant advantage by doing so. As we have
seen above, paying only the current leader increases the direct motivation of the
current leader to place the transaction in a microblock, but reduces the motiva-
tion of future miners to mine on this microblock. Moreover, if the leader does
not include the transaction before the end of its epoch, subsequent leaders will
have no motivation to place the transaction.
Other motives for fee manipulation, such as paying a large fee to encourage
miners to choose a certain branch after a fork, apply to Bitcoin as well as Bitcoin-
NG, and are outside the scope of this work.
3.3.2 Censorship Resistance
A central goal of Bitcoin is to prevent a malicious discriminating miner from
dropping a user’s transactions. Censorship resistance is not impacted by the
frequent microblocks of Bitcoin-NG.
First, we note that a leader’s absolute power is limited to her epoch of lead-
ership. A malicious leader can perform a DoS attack by placing no transactions
in microblocks. Similarly, a benign leader that crashes during her epoch of lead-
ership will publish no microblocks. Their influence ends once the next leader
publishes her key block. The impact of such behaviors is therefore similar to
that in Bitcoin, where nodes may mine empty blocks, but rarely do.
Assuming an honest majority and no backlog, a user will have her transac-
tion placed in the first block generated by an honest miner. Since at least 3/4
of the blocks are generated by honest miners, the user will have to wait for 4/3
blocks on average, or 13.33 minutes. Key block intervals can be set to a rate
that would reduce censorship to the minimum allowed by the network without
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incurring prohibitive deterioration of other metrics.
3.3.3 Resilience to Mining Power Variation
Following Bitcoin’s success, hundreds of alternative currencies were cre-
ated [167], most with Bitcoin’s exact blockchain structure, and many with the
same proof-of-work mechanism. To maintain a stable rate of blocks, different
instances of the blockchain tune their proof of work difficulty at different rates:
Bitcoin once every 2016 blocks – about 2 weeks, Litecoin [114] every 2016 blocks
(produced at a higher rate) – about 3.5 days, and Ethereum [66] on every block –
about 12 seconds. However, whichever adjustment rate is chosen, these proto-
cols are all sensitive to sudden mining power drops. Such drops happen when
miners are incentivized to stop mining due to a drop in the currency’s exchange
rate, or to mine for a different currency that becomes more profitable due to a
change in mining difficulty or exchange rate of either currency. Such changes
are especially problematic for small alt-coins. When their value rises, they ob-
serve a rapid rise in mining power, and subsequently a drop in mining power
once the difficulty rises. Then, since the difficulty is high, the remaining miners
need a longer time to generate the next block, potentially orders of magnitude
longer.
In Bitcoin-NG, difficulty adjustments can create a similar problem; however,
it only affects key blocks. Microblocks are generated at the same constant rate.
As a consequence, in case of a sudden mining power drop, Bitcoin-NG’s cen-
sorship resistance is reduced, as key blocks are generated infrequently. If a
malicious miner becomes a leader, it will generate microblocks until an hon-
est leader finds a key block. Nevertheless, transaction processing continues at
the same rate, in microblocks. Additionally, even until the difficulty is tuned
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Figure 3.5: Key block fork. Blocks B and C have the same chain weight, and the
fork is not resolved until key block D is published.
to a correct value, the ratio of time during which malicious miners are leaders
remains proportional to their mining power.
3.3.4 Forks
When issuing microblocks at a high frequency, Bitcoin-NG observes a fork al-
most on every key block generation, as the previous leader keeps generating
microblocks until it receives the key block (Figure 3.2). These forks are resolved
quickly — once the new key block arrives at a node, it switches to the new
leader. In comparison, when running Bitcoin at such high frequency, forks are
only resolved by the heaviest chain extension rule, and since different miners
may mine on different branches, branches remain extant for a longer time com-
pared to Bitcoin-NG.
Bitcoin-NG may also experience key block forks, where multiple key blocks
are generated after the same prefix of key blocks, as shown in Figure 3.5. This
rarely happens, due to the low frequency and quick propagation of the small
key blocks. The duration of such a fork may be long, lasting until the next key
block. The result is therefore infrequent, but long, key block forks.
Although such long forks are undesirable, they are not dangerous. The
knowledge of the fork is propagated through the network, and once it reaches
the nodes, they are aware of the undetermined state. All transactions that ap-
pear only on one branch are therefore uncertain until one branch gains a lead.
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Competition on Key Block Forks. Key block forks raise additional consider-
ations regarding the security of the system. One such consideration is the case,
where competing leaders publish transactions that pay a large fee to the subse-
quent miner in order to entice the other miners to choose their branch. While
this competition may introduce interesting dynamics beyond the scope of this
work, we note that each branch may copy the transactions placed in the mi-
croblocks of the competing branch. Hence, even if an attacker is motivated to
place significant fees due to external incentives, her competitor would place the
same transactions in her microblocks and remove the attacker’s advantage.
3.3.5 Double Spending
Double-spending attacks remain a vulnerability in Bitcoin-NG, though to a
lesser extent than in Bitcoin.
Consider a Nakamoto blockchain and a Bitcoin-NG blockchain with the
same bandwidth, where the Nakamoto block interval is the same as the key-
block interval. A double-spending attacker publishes a transaction tA, receives
a service from a merchant, and publishes an alternative conflicting transac-
tion tB. A merchant that requires very high confidence should wait for sev-
eral Nakamoto blocks, or an equivalent number of Bitcoin-NG key blocks. With
lower confidence requirements, the guarantees of the protocols differ.
In Nakamoto’s blockchain, blocks are infrequent, and transactions are col-
lected by miners until they find a block. Until that time, a transaction tA can
be replaced by another transaction tB without cost. Publication of conflicting
transactions with different destinations is prohibited by the standard Bitcoin
software, which also warns the user of conflicting transactions propagating in
the network [100].
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In contrast, in Bitcoin-NG, microblocks are frequent, and so a leader commits
to a transaction by placing it in a microblock. It cannot place tB without forming
a fork and subsequently losing all of its prize from its leadership epoch via a
poison transaction.
Other attacks are still possible, where a miner mines before the microblock
of transaction tA and later places a conflicting tB. Here, the attacker loses the
fees of all transactions in pruned microblocks, but this may be worthwhile since
the loot from the double-spend can be arbitrarily high. An attacker can mine to
prune the chain in advance, and then place a conflicting transaction, or try to
prune after the fact.
Reasoning about such attacks calls for a formalization of the attacker’s in-
centives and total mining power. We defer formal analysis that quantifies the
security guarantees of Bitcoin-NG and Nakamoto’s blockchain to future work.
In practice, merchants perform risk analysis to choose a strategy appropriate for
their business.
3.3.6 Wallet Security
Wallets are secured by one or more private keys. The holder of such keys can
generate transactions to spend funds in a wallet. The possibility of placing a
poison transaction enables an attacker that obtains private keys of a leader to
revoke her revenue retroactively and earn a small amount. However, such an
attacker is better off trying to steal the full revenue of the leader when it becomes
available, therefore the introduction of the poison transaction does not add a
significant vulnerability.
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Figure 3.6: Point-consensus delay example with three Bitcoin nodes a, b, and c
that generate blocks at heights 1, 2, and 3 (explosions) and learn that these
blocks are in the main chain (clouds). Intervals ∆1 and ∆2 are the 50%-point
consensus delays at times t1 and t2, respectively: At least a majority of the nodes
at ti agree on the history until ti −∆i.
3.4 Metrics
We now detail novel metrics by which blockchains can be evaluated. These
metrics are designed to evaluate the unique properties of Nakamoto consensus.
Consensus Delay. Intuitively, consensus delay is the time it takes for a system
to reach agreement. We start by defining, for a specific execution and time, how
long back nodes have to look to find a point where they agree on the state.
In a specific execution of an algorithm, given a time t and a ratio 0 < ε ≤ 1,
the ε point consensus delay is the smallest time difference ∆ such that at least
ε · |N | of the nodes at time t report the same state machine transition prefix up
to time t−∆. An example for the Bitcoin protocol is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
The consensus delay is the best point-consensus-delay the system achieves
for a certain fraction of the time, on average. More formally, the (ε, δ) consensus
delay of a system is the δ-percentile ε-point-consensus-delay. For example, if 90%
of the time, 50% of the nodes agree on the state of the state machine 10 seconds
ago (but not less than that), then the (50%, 90%)-consensus delay is 10 seconds.
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Fairness. We calculate two ratios: (1) the ratio of transitions not coming from
the largest miner with respect to all transitions, and (2) the ratio of mining power
not owned by the largest miner with respect to all mining power. We call the
ratio of these ratios the fairness.
Optimally the fairness is 1.0: The largest miner and the non-largest miners’
representation in the transitions set should be the same as their respective min-
ing powers.
Mining Power Utilization. The security of a proof-of-work system derives
from the mining power used to secure it; that is, the mining power an attacker
has to outrun to obtain disproportionate control. The mining power utilization is
the ratio between the mining power that secures the system and the total mining
power. Mining power wasted on work that does not appear on the blockchain
accounts for the difference.
Subjective Time to Prune. Due to the probabilistic nature of Nakamoto con-
sensus, a node may learn of a state machine transition and subsequently learn
that this transition has not occurred – that it was pruned from history. This is
the case with pruned branches in Bitcoin.
The δ time to prune is the δ-percentile of the difference between the time a
node learns about a transition that will eventually be pruned, and the time it
learns that this transition has not occurred. This implies what time a user has to
wait to be confident a transition has occurred. Note that this metric only con-
siders transitions that are eventually pruned. Figure 3.7 illustrates an example
with the Nakamoto Blockchain.
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Figure 3.7: A fork in the blockchain with blocks drawn at their generation times,
on a time X axis. Subjective time to prune is measured from when a node learns
of a block in a branch until it realizes what the main chain is. Time to win is
measured from the creation time of a block until the last time a node generated
a conflicting block.
Time to Win. The δ time to win is the δ percentile of the difference between
the first time a node believes a never-to-be-pruned-transition has occurred and
the last time a (different) node disagrees, believing an alternative transition has
occurred. It is zero if there are no disagreements, or if the latter time is earlier.
Figure 3.7 illustrates an example for the Bitcoin protocol.
3.5 Experimental Setup
We evaluate Bitcoin and Bitcoin-NG with 1000-node experiments running in
real time on an emulated network. Our experiments runs the original oper-
ational clients directly on the operating system, emulating only the network
properties and mining events.
Implementation. For Bitcoin, we run the standard client (release 0.10.0), here-
inafter Bitcoin, with minimal instrumentation to log sufficient information.
We implemented all Bitcoin-NG elements that are significant for a perfor-
mance analysis in the absence of an adversary, by modifying the standard Bit-
coin client (release 0.10.0). We did not implement the fee distribution and the
microblock signature check. Both elements have negligible impact on perfor-
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Figure 3.8: Bars represent the 75th, 50th and 25th percentiles of the correspond-
ing batch.
mance — fee distribution requires about one fixed point operation per transac-
tion and signature checking adds several milliseconds per microblock.
Simulated Mining. The time it takes a miner to find a solution follows a ge-
ometric probability distribution, which can be approximated as an exponential
distribution due to the improbability of a success in each guess and the rate of
guessing.
In our experiments we replace the proof of work mechanism with a sched-
uler that triggers block generation at different miners with exponentially dis-
tributed intervals.
Mining Power. The probability of mining a block is proportional on average
to the mining power used for solving the cryptopuzzle. Since blocks are gener-
ated at average set intervals and the total amount of mining power is large, the
interval between block generation events of a small miner is extremely large.
A single home miner using dedicated hardware is unlikely to mine a block for
years [158].
Consequently, mining power tends to centralize in the form of industrial
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mining and open mining pools. Industrial miners are companies that operate
large-scale mining facilities. Smaller miners that run private mining rigs typi-
cally join forces and form mining pools. All members of a pool work together to
mine each block, and share their revenues when one of them successfully mines
a block.
To reflect in our setup the varying power of miners, we examined the hash
power distribution among Bitcoin mining entities. The information we require
for the analysis, the identity of the entities generating each block, is voluntarily
provided by miners. We used a public API [27] to gather this information for
the year ending on August 31, 2015. We note that about 9% of the blocks are
unidentified. We considered each such block as generated by a different indi-
vidual miner.
For each week of the year, we calculate the weekly mining power of each entity,
and assign rank 1 to the largest weekly mining power, rank 2 to the second
largest, and so on. Figure 3.8 shows the weekly mining power of each entity by
rank up to 20. Bars of the same shade at different ranks show the distribution
of a specific week. Each batch of bars represents the collection of ratios for the
nth highest block generating pool. We note that the ranks of different entities is
not preserved throughout the weeks. The y-axis represents the weekly ratio of
blocks generated by a pool.
To model the size distribution of mining entities, we approximate it with an
exponential distribution with an exponent of −0.27. It yields a 0.99 coefficient
of determination compared with the medians of each rank.
Network. The structure of Bitcoin’s overlay network is complicated, and
much of it is intentionally hidden to preserve Bitcoin’s security against denial
of service (DoS) and to maintain participants’ privacy. (Other work [92, 129]
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discusses details on the peer-to-peer network.) Nodes do not reveal their neigh-
bors, but provide superset of nodes they have discovered. Many of the nodes
are hidden behind firewalls making it difficult to even estimate the full size of
the network. The latency among nodes is unknown. Moreover, for many of
the metrics that we measure, a critical measure is the time it takes between the
generation of a block by some miner and the time at which another miner starts
mining on it. The block not only has to be propagated and verified by the sec-
ond miner, but that second miner must also propagate the details to its mining
hardware. In the case of mining pools with many distant worker miners, this
may incur a non-negligible delay.
Lacking an existing model of the system, we construct a random network by
connecting each node to at least 5 other nodes, chosen uniformly at random. We
measured the latency to all visible Bitcoin nodes from a single vantage point on
April 7th, 2015, and created a latency histogram. We then set the latency among
each pair of nodes in the experiments based on this histogram. The bandwidth
is set to about 100kbit/sec among each pair of nodes.
To verify the validity of our setup and topology, we compare Bitcoin’s prop-
agation properties in our setup and in the operational system. We perform ex-
periments with different block sizes while changing the block frequency so that
the transaction-per-second load is constant. Figure 3.9 shows a linear relation
between the block size and the propagation time, similar to the linear relation
measured in the Bitcoin operational network by Decker and Wattenhofer [54].
No Transaction Propagation. The goal of this work is to optimize the consen-
sus mechanism of the Blockchain. However, when generating blocks at high
frequencies, the overhead of filling in the blocks by generating and propagating
transactions becomes a dominant factor with Bitcoin’s current implementation.
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Figure 3.9: In our system, block propagation time grows linearly with block size.
This qualitatively matches the linear relation observed in measurements of the
operational Bitcoin network [54].
This is not an inherent property of Bitcoin’s protocol, or of a Blockchain protocol
in general. To reduce the noise caused by the transaction generation and prop-
agation mechanism, we reduce transaction handling to the minimum. Before
starting an experiment, we initialize the blockchain with artificial transactions
and top up the mempools (the data structure storing yet-to-be-serialized trans-
actions) of all nodes with the same set of transactions. The transactions are of
identical size; the operational Bitcoin system as of today, at 1MB blocks every 10
minutes, has a bandwidth of 3.5 such transactions per second.
3.6 Evaluation
We evaluate Bitcoin-NG and compare it with Bitcoin in two sets of experiments,
varying block frequency and block size.
Overall, the experiments show that it is possible to improve Bitcoin’s con-
sensus delay and bandwidth by tuning its parameters, but its performance de-
teriorates dangerously on all security-related metrics. Bitcoin-NG qualitatively
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outperforms Bitcoin, as it suffers no such deterioration, while enjoying superior
performance in almost all metrics across the entire measured range. The band-
width of Bitcoin-NG is only limited by the processing speed of the individual
nodes, as higher throughput does not introduce key-block forks. The consensus
delay is determined directly by the network propagation time, because in the
common case all nodes agree on the main chain once they receive the latest key
block.
In the experiments that follow, we choose the 90th percentile. Lower per-
centiles maintain the same trends, and very low percentiles show excellent per-
formance – there is always a small subset of nodes that has the correct chain.
However, with higher percentiles, the results are lost in the noise. With 1000
nodes and at high percentiles, e.g., 99%, we are measuring the 10th slowest
node. Since there are always a few nodes that lag behind, either consistently or
temporarily, the results then are dominated by this random behavior, and the
trends are not visible.
We measure the metrics we introduced by instantiating them to Nakamoto’s
blockchain and to Bitcoin-NG as follows.
Consensus delay. We take the (90%, 90%)-consensus delay based on block gen-
eration times. Point-consensus-delay for Bitcoin is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, a user who requires high confidence (e.g.,
99%) will not gain better latency with Bitcoin-NG, and must wait for sev-
eral key blocks to accept a transaction as completed. The guarantees in
such cases are similar to those of Bitcoin with the same block interval as
Bitcoin-NG’s key-block interval.
Fairness. We calculate the proportion of (1) the ratio of blocks in the main chain
not generated by the largest miner with respect to all blocks in the main
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chain, and (2) the ratio of blocks not generated by the largest miner with
respect to all generated blocks.
Mining power utilization. We calculate the proportion between the aggregate
work of the main chain blocks and all blocks. In Bitcoin-NG, difficulty
is only accrued in key blocks, so microblock forks do not reduce mining
power utilization.
Time to prune. For each node and for each branch, we measure the time it took
for the node to prune this branch. This is the time between the receipt of
the first branch block and the receipt of the main chain block that is longer
than this branch (Figure 3.7). We take the 90th percentile of all samples.
Time to win. We take the 90th percentile of the time from the generation of each
main-chain block to the last time another miner generates a block that is
not its descendant (Figure 3.7).
Experiments. We run multiple experiments with different parameters. The
figures show the average value for each group of measurements with error bars
marking the extreme values. The sampled values are shown as markers.
For each execution we run for 50-100 Bitcoin blocks or Bitcoin-NG mi-
croblocks. We perform multiple short runs since all transactions are preloaded
for each execution. The mean key-block interval in our experiments is 10 sec-
onds, so each experiment includes leader changes. We do not consider cases
where key-block forks occur, since in reality one would choose a much larger
key-block interval, e.g., 10 minutes, making key-block forks extremely rare
(more rare than with the operational Bitcoin system).
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Figure 3.10: Experiment results.
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3.6.1 Block Frequency
First, we run experiments targeted at improving the consensus delay. For Bit-
coin, we vary the frequency of block generation by reducing the proof-of-work
difficulty. For Bitcoin-NG, keeping the key block generation at one every 100
seconds, we vary the frequency of microblock generation. For each frequency,
we choose the block size (microblock size for Bitcoin-NG) such that the payload
throughput is identical to that of Bitcoin’s operational system, that is, one 1MB
block every 10 minutes. Figure 3.10(a) shows the results.
We confirm that the bandwidth, measured as transaction frequency, is close
to 3.5, the operational Bitcoin rate of for such transactions. In our experiments,
Bitcoin’s bandwidth is smaller than that of Bitcoin-NG, giving Bitcoin an advan-
tage with respect to the other metrics.
As expected, a higher block frequency reduces Bitcoin’s consensus delay as
transactions are placed in the ledger at a higher frequency. Time to prune im-
proves significantly as block frequency increases. Nevertheless, Bitcoin’s fre-
quent forks leave it with higher consensus delay and time to prune than Bitcoin-
NG. We note that although they can be made arbitrarily rare, key block forks do
occur. Such key-block forks are only resolved once one branch has more key
blocks than the others, resulting in a long time to prune if key block intervals
are long.
Bitcoin’s mining power utilization drops quickly as frequency increases,
tending towards 1/4, the size of the largest miner. At the extreme, block gener-
ation is so fast that by the time a miner learns of a block generated by another
miner, that other miner has generated more blocks. Then, only the largest miner
generates main chain blocks, and the other miners catch up. This also implies
the deterioration of fairness, as forks are likely to be resolved by the largest
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miner extending its preferred branch. As miners struggle to catch up with the
leading pack, slow miners mine on old blocks and the time to win metric in-
creases.
Since contention in Bitcoin-NG is limited to key block generation, forks re-
main rare despite high frequencies of microblocks. Increasing the microblock
frequency achieves reduction of both consensus delay and time to prune. All
other metrics are unaffected and remain at the optimal level.
In the low-frequency experiments of Bitcoin-NG, we observe a slight mining
power utilization decrease and time to prune increase. This is an artifact of the
experimental setup. We run the experiments over a set number of blocks, there-
fore these low contention experiments run for an extended period, enough to
observe key block forks. Note, however, that a realistic Bitcoin-NG implementa-
tion can space the key blocks much further apart without affecting performance.
Then, due to their small size, key-block forks are highly unlikely, even more so
than with standard blocks of Nakamoto’s blockchain at the same rate, due to
the small size of the key blocks.
3.6.2 Block Size
To study bandwidth scalability, we run experiments with different block sizes.
We use high frequencies, similar to those of Ethereum [66], setting Bitcoin’s
block frequency to 1/10sec and Bitcoin-NG’s microblock frequency to 1/10sec
and key block frequency to 1/100sec. Figure 3.10(b) shows the result.
As expected, the transaction frequency increases with block size; the hori-
zontal line shows the operational Bitcoin rate.
Large blocks take longer to verify and propagate. Therefore, although block
frequency is constant, the time it takes for a miner to learn of a new block is
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longer, and so the chance for forks increases.
These experiments demonstrate the expected tradeoff between bandwidth
and latency. Consensus delay increases due to forks, as it takes longer to choose
the main chain. The time to win also increases, as blocks take longer to catch up
with the larger blocks, as does time to prune due to the many forks.
While this tradeoff may be acceptable, allowing for some hunt for a sweet
spot on the tradeoff curve, the real problem pertains to security. The forks
cause significant mining power loss, reaching about 80% at Bitcoin’s bandwidth
(though at a higher block frequency), making the system vulnerable to attackers
that are much smaller.
Even more detrimental is the reduction in fairness. Even a minor degra-
dation in fairness is dangerous, since it provides incentives to miners to avoid
losses by joining forces to enjoy the advantage of mining in a larger pool. This
leads to centralization of the mining power, obviating Bitcoin’s security proper-
ties.
Bitcoin-NG demonstrates qualitative improvement, suffering no significant
degradation in the security-related metrics of fairness and mining power. Un-
der heavy load, however, the clients are approaching their processing capacity,
making it hard for them to keep up, and we observe degradation in consensus
delay and time to prune.
3.7 Conclusion
As Bitcoin and related cryptocurrencies have become surprisingly popular, they
have hit scalability limits. The technical debate to improve scalability has been
hampered by a perceived inherent tradeoff between performance metrics and
security goals of the system. Consequently, the discussions have become acri-
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monious, long-term solutions have seemed elusive, and the current sentiment
has centered around short-term, incremental, compromise solutions.
Bitcoin-NG shows that it is possible to improve the scalability of blockchain
protocols to the point where the consensus latency is limited solely by the
network diameter and the throughput bottleneck lies only in node processing
power. Such scaling is key in allowing for blockchain technology to fulfill its
promise of implementing trustless consensus for a variety of demanding appli-
cations including payments, digital asset transactions, and smart contracts — at
global scale.
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CHAPTER 4
SERVICE-ORIENTED SHARDING FOR BLOCKCHAINS
Solutions for scaling blockchains typically overlook the fact that blockchains
host multiple different services and involve participants with diverse expecta-
tions. But taking these aspects into consideration promises new on-chain scala-
bility opportunities, providing approaches that scale with increasing number of
services. Combining existing scaling solutions with these approaches enables
further improvements.
Blockchains offer many opportunities for facilitating innovation in tradi-
tional industries. They have received extensive attention due to the trustless
auditability, tamper-resistance, and transparency they provide in networks with
Byzantine participants. Not surprisingly, there is much commercial interest in
developing specialized blockchain solutions [44]. There have been proposals
to use blockchains as an underlying layer for services including managing digi-
tal assets [46], issuing securities [36], tracking intellectual property [134, 18, 109],
maintaining land records and deeds [150, 16], facilitating online voting [81], reg-
istering domain names [115], as well as others. Ongoing projects explore ways
to make it easier to build such services using Blockchain-as-a-Service (BaaS)
platforms [126, 95].
This movement, towards increased adoption of blockchains for specialized
purposes, portends a dangerous trend: accommodating all of these diverse uses,
either in a single blockchain or in separate blockchains, inherently requires com-
plex tradeoffs. The simplest approach, of layering these additional blockchains
on top of an existing, secure blockchain with sufficient mining power to with-
stand attacks, such as Bitcoin [131], leads to a stream of costly and burden-
some transactions. Indeed, we have seen the controversial OP_RETURN opcode
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adopted for this purpose, and its use has been increasing rapidly [34], in line
with increased usage of layered blockchains. Yet these transactions, which use
Bitcoin solely as a timestamping and ordering service, increase the resource re-
quirements for system participation and the time to bootstrap a node. In con-
trast, creating a dedicated, specialized, standalone blockchain avoids this prob-
lem, but suffers from a lack of independent mining power to secure the infras-
tructure. Duplicating the mining infrastructure used to secure Bitcoin is not
only costly and environmentally unfriendly, but it is difficult to bootstrap such
a system. Faced with this dilemma, some have turned to permissioned ledgers
with closed participants [113, 29], forgoing the open architecture, the flexible
trust model, and the strong security guarantees of the existing Bitcoin mining
ecosystem.
In this chapter, we present Aspen, a protocol that securely shards the
blockchain to provide high scalability to service users. This protocol employs a
sharding approach that comes with the following benefits: (1) preserves the to-
tal computational power of miners to secure the whole blockchain, (2) prevents
users from double-spending their funds while maintaining the same trustless
setup assumptions as Bitcoin, (3) improves scalability by absolving non-miner
participants – i.e. service users – from the responsibility of storing, processing,
and propagating irrelevant data to confirm the validity of services they are in-
terested in. In this protocol, a coffee shop does not have to worry about the land
and deed records in the blockchain to validate the payment system.
Sharding is a well-established technique to improve scalability by distribut-
ing contents of a database across nodes in a network. But sharding blockchains
is non-trivial. The main difficulty is to preserve the trustless nature while hiding
parts of a blockchain from other nodes. It is an open research question whether
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it is possible to shard blockchains in a way that the output of a transaction in
one shard can be spent at another while still satisfying the trustless validation of
transaction history. In this work, the key insight behind sharding the blockchain
is to distribute transactions to blocks with respect to services they are used for.
This chapter outlines service-oriented sharding, a technique for sharding
blockchains that promises higher scalability and extensibility without modify-
ing Bitcoin’s trust model. It instantiates this technique in Aspen, a blockchain
sharding protocol that expedites user access to relevant services, makes service
integration and maintenance easier, and achieves better fairness while demand-
ing only a fraction of resources from users.
4.1 Service-Oriented Sharding
The core idea behind service-oriented sharding is to partition a blockchain such
that users can fully validate the correct functioning of their services (1) with-
out relying on trusted entities and (2) while keeping track of only the subset of
the blockchain relevant to their services. This technique shares the same net-
work and trust model as Bitcoin and related cryptocurrencies. Service-oriented
sharding is built around a multiblockchain structure, where multiple chains are
rooted in the same genesis block and share common checkpoints (See Fig. 4.1).
Building blocks comprising service-oriented sharding can be summarized as
follows:
Channel. A chain in a blockchain built on a shared genesis block containing
(1) all transactions of a specific service, and (2) common checkpoints involving
transactions for the overall management of services. For instance, a domain
name resolution service would use a dedicated channel to store custom transac-
tions in the form of DNS resource records. Such transactions are kept separate
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Figure 4.1: Multiblockchain structure of service-oriented sharding. Each chan-
nel contains the same genesis block (drop) and checkpoints (valves), as well as
the exclusive transactions of a specific service (buckets with the same symbol).
Generating a checkpoint requires a proof of work. Miners distribute transac-
tions to designated blocks (a subset of dashed rectangles) secured by check-
points.
from common checkpoints. Hence, services are loosely coupled and resilient to
changes.
Service-oriented sharding handles requests associated with a certain service
by annotating each channel and the corresponding transactions with the same
unique identifier, called service number. Two special channels, payment and reg-
istration, are defined by the system and help bootstrap the network. The default
service that enables users to exchange funds runs on the payment channel, and
the registration channel is used to add or update services. Users store, process,
and propagate transactions on channels only for the relevant services.
Protocol. A set of rules regarding services and their integration. A service
protocol defines the validity of transactions in a given channel. It describes:
(1) the syntax for each transaction type, (2) the relationship between transactions
within a channel, (3) the size, frequency, and format constraints for blocks that
keep transactions. The integration protocol specifies the security, incentive mech-
anism, valid service numbers, the genesis block, and the inter-channel commu-
nication process between the payment channel and the other channels.
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Transaction. The smallest unit of data for adding content to a channel. Trans-
actions are grouped into blocks and appended to each channel according to their
service number. A block is valid if it (1) embodies valid transactions sharing the
same service number and (2) complies with the integration protocol and the
relevant service protocol.
Service Integration and Maintenance. The process of introducing services
and updating the existing ones. Service-oriented sharding resolves this process
completely on the blockchain in three phases. First, users propose protocols
to introduce or update services by generating transactions for the registration
channel. Each such transaction contains a set of service protocols with distinct
service numbers. A service protocol is specified in a platform independent lan-
guage such as WebAssembly [166] or Lua [117]. In the second phase, miners
conduct an election to choose a registration channel transaction. This transac-
tion specifies the protocols that miners are collectively willing to adopt. Miners
indicate their choice using ballots. A ballot is a transaction that contains a refer-
ence to a particular transaction in the registration channel. Each ballot is part of
a checkpoint that requires a proof of work to generate. This provides (1) repre-
sentation proportional to mining power, and (2) protection against censorship
of ballots. Finally, if a particular transaction is referred by more than a certain
fraction τ of ballots, its protocols become active. An active service protocol de-
termines the validity of new transactions added to the corresponding channel.
This process enables evolutionary refinement with the confidence of sustain-
ability. Users are involved in the process through their proposals. The election
mechanism ensures that the majority of the mining power intends to serialize
transactions for the new or updated services.
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4.2 Aspen
While service-oriented sharding can be built on any blockchain protocol [131,
75, 102, 66], we instantiate on Bitcoin-NG [75] (see Chapter 3), a blockchain pro-
tocol that improves transaction throughput and consensus latency of Bitcoin
under the same trust model. The protocol makes the following changes with
service-oriented sharding:
Multiple Microblock Chains. Traditional blockchain protocols strive to agree
on a single main chain in which all transactions are totally ordered. However, not
all transactions are related or even need such an ordering. This leads to a seem-
ingly irreconcilable tradeoff between the scalability of independent blockchains
and the security of monolithic ones. The central idea behind Aspen is to resolve
this conundrum by having a series of independent microblock chains conjoined
at common key blocks. A channel represents the combination of the same gen-
esis block, all key blocks, and the set of microblock chains containing custom
transactions annotated with the same service number. Fig. 4.2 illustrates the
structure.
Each channel maintains key blocks to enforce the integration protocol. To
prevent bloating key blocks, Aspen (1) limits the number of channel references
in a key block and (2) omits references to non-payment channels with no trans-
actions on their latest microblock chain – i.e. inert channels. Note that users can
fully validate an inert channel service using key blocks of the payment channel.
Extensibility. Aspen updates or introduces services at designated growth
points, called buds (See Fig. 4.2). A bud is a key block at a protocol-defined
height in terms of the number of key blocks from the genesis block. Aspen
adopts proposals based on ballots in key blocks between the current and the
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C0:payment
C1:registration
C2:domain name
C3:intellectual property t
C0: ...... ...
C2: ...... ...
...
C1: ...... ...
C3:
Figure 4.2: Structure of the Aspen chain. Upon generating a key block shared
by all channels, a miner serializes service-specific transactions only in the cor-
responding microblock (circles) chains. Shading indicates blocks generated by
a specific miner. A bud (dashed key block) introduces the intellectual property
service.
......Payment
channel:
t
(a) A funding pore.
...
...
...
(b) A coinbase transaction.
Figure 4.3: (a) A funding pore (cylinder) makes payment channel outputs (pen-
tagons) spendable at specific channels. (b) Rewards are split between the cur-
rent and the previous miner for each channel.
preceding bud.
Flow of Funds. Aspen enables users to detect double spends by making each
fund spendable only in a specific channel. A special payment channel transac-
tion, funding pore, enables users to lock funds to other channels. A funding pore
annotates each output with the service number of an existing destination chan-
nel where it can be spent. Note that transfers across channels are allowed only
in one way, from the payment channel to others. Fig. 4.3(a) illustrates a funding
pore.
Alternatively, users can directly buy locked funds at the target channel to
pay for the service running on the corresponding channel. The protocol en-
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forces a high minimum fee for serializing funding pores to (1) discourage users
from bloating the payment channel and (2) improve the fungibility of funds
in non-payment channels. Contrary to Bitcoin’s OP_RETURN transactions, this
process does not yield any unspendable outputs.
Following sections detail the incentive and security mechanisms in Aspen.
4.2.1 Reward Structure
The process of keeping the complete blockchain, serializing transactions, and
securing the system consumes miner resources. Aspen uses a Bitcoin-like cryp-
tocurrency to encourage miners to continue facilitating this costly process. Min-
ers collect their rewards through coinbase transactions in key blocks. A coinbase
transaction provides separate outputs to compensate the current and the previ-
ous miner for each service they provision. Each output indicates the source
channel of rewards where funds can be spent (See Fig. 4.3(b)).
Generating Key Blocks. Miners receive a fixed subsidy for each key block
they generate as an incentive for using their mining power to secure the
blockchain and facilitating the voting process of service integration and main-
tenance.
Serializing Transactions. Each service protocol specifies the validity require-
ments for its transactions. The common property of all transactions is a fee that
miners collect for adding them to the corresponding microblocks.
Extending the Longest Chains. As an incentive for the next miner to attach
her key block to the latest microblock [75], Aspen distributes fees between the
current miner and the next one for each microblock chain.
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Extending Multiple Chains. Miners can spend transaction fees only in the
corresponding channels that they were collected from. The high minimum fees
for funding pores encourage users to purchase locked funds. Hence miners gain
additional incentives to serialize non-payment channel transactions.
4.2.2 Security
The following properties are critical to the security of a blockchain protocol.
Authenticity. The property of having an indisputable origin. Transactions re-
quire a set of cryptographic signatures to prove the ownership of funds that are
used as fees. Hence, provided that it is infeasible to forge signatures, pseudony-
mous identities cannot deny committing transactions.
Irreversibility. The protection against overwriting or deleting transactions.
Double spending is an instance of violating this property. Malicious miners
may modify or remove a set of transactions from a blockchain by updating some
common prefix with different blocks – i.e. forks. Aspen secures the blockchain
against (1) key block forks by picking the chain containing the most proof of
work with random tie-breaking and (2) microblock forks using poison transac-
tions [75].
Censorship. The ability of miners to block submission or retrieval of transac-
tions. A key block miner becomes eligible to update the blockchain for a discrete
epoch. However, she may ignore certain transactions in particular channels due
to benign failures or malicious behavior. The extend of such censorship is lim-
ited to the miner’s epoch, which can be adjusted by changing the key block
frequency.
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An adversary can leave a victim unable to retrieve transactions by control-
ling all of its connections [92] or delaying the delivery of valid transactions to
her [87]. Countermeasures to mitigate such attacks apply to this work, as well.
4.3 Discussion
In Aspen, funds do not flow back to the payment channel, or across non-
payment channels – i.e. each fund is spendable only in a specific channel. The
absence bi-directional fund flow makes it possible for service users to detect
double spends without keeping track of all channels.
Extending Aspen to enable the atomic exchange of funds between any two
channels, x and y, may prove problematic: The simplest approach of adding
exchange transactions to key blocks would bloat the blockchain for users of ser-
vices other than x and y. Whereas keeping the exchange information in channels
of x and y would make these channels co-dependent; hence, it enforces users of
these services to store, process, and propagate all transactions on both channels
for trustless validation. An ideal solution should avoid such co-dependence and
bloating.
4.4 Conclusion
Service-oriented sharding provides a means for improving the scalability and
extensibility of blockchains with multiple services. To achieve these goals, this
technique separates service users from miners, securely addressing the diverse
expectations of different participants.
Aspen, the instantiation of service-oriented sharding on Bitcoin-NG (see
Chapter 3), reduces the resource requirements and the bootstrapping time to
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participate in the system. It provides trustless validation while preserving the
same network and trust model as Bitcoin. Finally, it avoids fragmentation of the
mining power that secures the blockchain.
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CHAPTER 5
DECENTRALIZATION IN BITCOIN AND ETHEREUM NETWORKS
There is a fundamental tension between scalability and decentralization of
blockchains. While scaling solutions would improve the peak throughput and
latency of given services, they may also weaken the decentralized nature of the
corresponding blockchains. Hence, a scientific quantification of decentraliza-
tion is critical in assessing the level of decentralization in operational systems
and demonstrating the viability of different scaling proposals.
The key feature that empowers innovative services and makes blockchain-
based platforms interesting is decentralization. Decentralization is a property
regarding the fragmentation of control over the protocol. In the Bitcoin and
Ethereum protocols, participants take steps by generating blocks at a rate pro-
portional to their computational power. Better decentralization means higher
resistance against censorship and tampering. However, if the underlying net-
work properties are inadequate, this fairness property does not hold, as partici-
pants are lagging behind and taking deprecated steps.
While ongoing research explores ways to make the Bitcoin and Ethereum
networks more decentralized, their current state of decentralization is not well-
understood. Hence, debates and decisions about the underlying networks are
usually based on assumptions rather than quantitative studies.
In this chapter, through a comprehensive and longitudinal analysis of the de-
centralization in these operational systems, we shed light on whether existing
assumptions are really satisfied in practice. We build on prior Internet measure-
ment techniques, as well as novel approaches for blockchain-based platforms.
Our main data sources are (1) direct measurements on these networks, (2) a
Bitcoin relay network called Falcon that we deployed and operated for a year,
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and (3) blockchain histories of Bitcoin and Ethereum. Our study presents find-
ings regarding the network properties, impact of protocol requirements, secu-
rity, and client interactions.
This chapter makes three contributions. First, it provides new tools and tech-
niques for measuring blockchain-based cryptocurrency networks. A critical tool
that provided invaluable data for this study is the Falcon relay network that we
built to serve as a backbone for ferrying blocks. We deployed this network for
Bitcoin across five continents, capturing unique data. Second, we perform a
comparative, quantitative study of the level of decentralization in Bitcoin and
Ethereum. Our key findings are: (1) the Bitcoin network is substantially better
provisioned, (2) the geolocation and the neighbor selection algorithms of peers
are critical to their performance, (3) higher protocol overhead for establishing
links between peers makes Ethereum network prone to centralization under
high churn, (4) the hash power is more widely distributed in Bitcoin, (5) due
to its lower block generation rate and better network properties, Bitcoin’s min-
ing utilization is higher. Nevertheless, Ethereum demonstrates better fairness
in terms of miner revenue. (6) Bitcoin nodes are significantly more up to date.
Finally, we identify potential protocol and infrastructure improvements. For ex-
ample, Bitcoin IPv4 network undergoes a surprising improvement in its band-
width capacity; hence, offers opportunities for enhancing the scalability – e.g.
higher block size/frequency. Moreover, lower network resources in Ethereum
infrastructure indicates that peers would benefit from a relay network.
5.1 Bitcoin and Ethereum Wire Protocols
Despite their architectural similarity, Bitcoin and Ethereum exhibit substantial
differences in their API, abstractions, and wire protocol. Chapter 2 provided
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the background on these two systems. In this section, we present the details of
the corresponding wire protocols that are relevant to the measurements in this
chapter.
5.1.1 The Bitcoin Wire Protocol
The first step to communicate with a Bitcoin client is to establish a TCP con-
nection. Once the connection is made, clients exchange unencrypted, protocol-
level messages. Each such message consists of a header and a payload, where
the header contains: (1) a so-called magic number as a network identity – e.g.
0xD9B4BEF9 for the main network, (2) the command name – e.g. version,
getdata, (3) the payload length, and (4) the first 4 bytes of the double-SHA256
hash of the payload
Handshake. Protocol-level communication starts with a handshake. To initi-
ate this process, the local client sends a version message to the remote client.
This message contains: (1) the protocol version of the local client, (2) a flag indi-
cating services that the local client provides, (3) the local time, (4) the network
addresses of the local and the remote clients, (5) a random node id to detect
connections to self, (6) a human-readable name of the local client, (7) the last
block height known to the local client, and (8) an optional relay flag indicating
whether the remote client should announce relayed transactions or not.
The remote client acknowledges the communication request with a message
header for verack, and sends a version message to connect back.
Requesting Data. Clients use getdata messages to ask for the desired
blockchain components. Each such message specifies the number of requested
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objects, and a list of inventories each containing a SHA256 hash and a flag indi-
cating the identity and type of the object – e.g. a block or a transaction.
Upon receiving a getdata message, a client responds with the requested
objects. While the latest version of the protocol supports compact [48] and
Merkle blocks, the measurement system presented in this chapter focuses on
retrieval of full blocks, having transactions and a solution to a cryptopuzzle.
5.1.2 The Ethereum Wire Protocol
Contrary to Bitcoin, not all communication in Ethereum is over TCP. Ethereum
employs a UDP-based node discovery mechanism inspired by Kademlia [121],
but the rest of the P2P communication is over TCP. Messages between nodes
are encrypted and authenticated. Our primary sources in this section are client
implementations [89, 143, 51, 137] and Ethereum wiki pages [69, 64, 67, 68, 65]
Upon establishing a TCP connection, the initiator and the responder perform
an encryption, a P2P protocol, a subprotocol, and an optional DAO handshake
(for subprotocol versions ≥ 62) before exchanging any other messages. In ad-
dition to the address and the port number, nodes rely on unique public keys,
dubbed the node IDs, for communication.
Encryption Handshake. The initial handshake sets up an encrypted session
between the initiator and the responder. First, the initiator sends an auth mes-
sage encrypted with responder’s node ID. This message, based on RLPx v3 [68],
contains (1) a signature to verify if clients agree on the shared secret, (2) a SHA3
hash of initiator’s ephemeral public key to authenticate the signature, (3) the
node ID of the initiator, (4) a nonce value, and (5) a flag indicating if the respon-
der knows the initiator. If clients recognize each other, the shared secret is the
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token of the last session between these parties, otherwise the secret is generated
based on their node IDs.
The responder decrypts the auth message, verifies the secret, authenticates
the signature, and recovers the initiator’s ephemeral public key. The respon-
der’s acknowledgement [68] is encrypted with initiator’s node ID, and contains
(1) the ephemeral public key of the responder, (2) a nonce value, and (3) a flag
indicating if the responder knows the initiator.
Recent implementations of popular clients [89, 143, 51, 137] come with
the support for EIP-8 [64], which introduces RLPx v4 involving backwards-
compatible changes to the encryption handshake process. This version replaces
the auth flags and the corresponding acknowledgement messages with version
numbers and removes the ephemeral public key hash from auth messages.
P2P Protocol Handshake. Upon establishing an encrypted session, parties ex-
change hello messages, which contains (1) the local P2P protocol version, (2) a
human-readable name of the local client, (3) a list of capabilities each indicating
supported versions of a communication subprotocol – e.g. eth/62, (4) the port
number on which the client is listening, and (5) the node ID of the local client.
Starting with this handshake, a client may send a disconnect message for rea-
sons such as being connected to too many peers or having an incompatible P2P
protocol version.
Ethereum Subprotocol Handshake. Finally, clients exchange parameters re-
garding the eth subprotocol. To achieve this, each party sends a status mes-
sage, which contains (1) a chain difficulty representing the total difficulty over
the latest main chain block, (2) a hash of the local client’s chain head, (3) the
genesis block hash, (4) a network ID – e.g. 1 for the main network, and (5) the
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subprotocol version. Clients choose the subprotocol among the alternatives ex-
changed during the P2P protocol handshake based on the highest commonly
supported version. Handshake in subprotocol versions ≥ 62 ends with the op-
tional DAO handshake.
The Optional DAO Handshake. Hard forks change protocol rules to force
participants to bypass the chain selection rule. After the DAO hack [30], as part
of a remedial hard fork, the subprotocol has introduced an additional hand-
shake phase to enable clients in the main network to validate remote peers re-
garding this fork. This challenge succeeds if both clients support or oppose the
fork. The process involves validating the extra-data field in block headers,
which clients normally use for keeping the optional information. A pro-fork
client requires the value of this field to be "dao-hard-fork" for blocks in the
height range [1920000, 1920010). In practice, clients send a getblockheaders
message to request the header of the block that the DAO hard-fork has com-
menced on the main network. Then they check the extra-data field only for
this block. While sending this request is optional, if a client receives such a re-
quest, she must respond to prevent the remote peer from disconnecting due to
timeout.
Requesting Data. Clients request data using getblocks and getblockbodies
messages in subprotocol versions < 62 and ≥ 62, respectively. Each such mes-
sage contains a set of hashes identifying the requested block bodies or full
blocks.
Response to a getblockbodies message contains a list of transactions and
uncles for known blocks. Response to a getblocks message contains an addi-
tional block header for each such request. Starting with version 63, the subpro-
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Figure 5.1: The measurement infrastructure is built on 18 globally distributed
nodes.
tocol supports transaction receipt requests for fast synchronization. The mea-
surement system presented in this chapter focuses on retrieval of full blocks
and block bodies.
5.2 Measurement Infrastructure
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies operate on global peer-to-peer networks
that span multiple administrative domains. Measurement of such networks
concerns the exploration of the relationship between peers, the capabilities of
individual peers, and the properties of the system as a whole – e.g. its secu-
rity and fairness. To characterize Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, we deployed
Blockchain Measurement System (BMS), a measurement system that has been col-
lecting data for 12 months.
To enable an in-depth analysis, BMS relies on (1) execution on an infrastruc-
ture that spans 5 continents, (2) long-running processes for collecting data, (3) a
number of resourceful nodes, and (4) the Falcon Relay Network.
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Measurement Network Measured Nodes Dates
(Single Beacon)
• Bandwidth
(All)
• Latency
(Bitcoin IPv4)
Bitcoin
IPv4 3441 Jan 11 to 16, 2017 &Jan 30 to Mar 16, 2017
IPv6 515 Jan 13 to 14, 2017 &Apr 20 to 25, 2017
Tor 127 Jan 13, 2017 &Apr 23 to 25, 2017
Ethereum IPv4 285 Mar 27 to Apr 25, 2017
(Multiple Vantage
Points)
• P2P Latency
Bitcoin IPv4 3390 Jan 10 to 15, 2017 &Jan 30 to Mar 01, 2017
Ethereum IPv4 4302 Mar 01, 2017 toApr 11, 2017
(Single Beacon)
• Establishing
Links (All)
• Latency
(Bitcoin IPv6)
Bitcoin
IPv4 Connected: 4210 Jan 11 to 16, 2017 &Jan 30 to Mar 16, 2017Handshake: 4131
IPv6 Connected: 845 Jan 13 to 14, 2017 &Feb 03 to Apr 25, 2017Handshake: 837
Tor Connected: 183 Jan 13, 2017 &Apr 23 to 25, 2017Handshake: 180
Ethereum IPv4
Connected: 1976
Mar 27, 2017 to
Apr 25, 2017
PH1: 995
PH2: 742
PH3: 442
• Peer Freshness Bitcoin
IPv4 3450
Jan 16, 2017IPv6 737
Tor 151
Ethereum IPv4 514 Mar 27 to Apr 25, 2017
• Pruned Blocks
(Falcon)
Bitcoin IPv4 5977 May 5, 2016 toApr 29, 2017
Table 5.1: Timeline of measurements. "Connected" keyword in the "Measured
Nodes" column shows the number of nodes with which the BMS has established
a TCP connection. PH1–3 indicate measurements for encryption, P2P protocol,
and Ethereum subprotocol handshakes, respectively. Falcon is deployed on 10
distinct Amazon EC2 regions.
Multiple Vantage Points. Each vantage point in the measurement infrastruc-
ture provides a partial view of the networks from a given source. Combining
data from vantage points generates a more complete view of the system. In
particular, this enables us to examine peer-to-peer latency. Figure 5.1 shows the
geographic distribution of the measurement infrastructure. While 15 out of 18
nodes reside in PlanetLab’s global research network [40], the remaining nodes
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are part of Cornell’s academic network, located in Ithaca, NY.
Long-term Measurements. Collecting data for an extended period of time
helps in minimizing measurement errors, capturing the ongoing evolution of
networks, and collecting more distinct measurements on various network as-
pects. To achieve these goals, BMS has been continuously collecting data re-
garding the provisioned bandwidth of peers, peer-to-peer latency, and link es-
tablishment process. These measurements target (1) Bitcoin nodes connected
over IPv4, IPv6, and Tor and (2) Ethereum nodes connected over IPv4. As of
May 2017, Ethereum does not have any Tor nodes mainly because Tor is exclu-
sively TCP, whereas Ethereum node discovery is UDP-based. Moreover, this
study excludes Ethereum’s IPv6 network because BMS was not able to discover
sufficient number of nodes in this network. Table 5.1 shows the timeline of the
data collection for each network containing different number of nodes that re-
spond to the corresponding measurements. BMS obtains the node information
from Bitcoin and Ethereum node crawling sites [1, 70], and a locally deployed
Ethereum supernode configured with a high peer limit.
Interpretations in this chapter assume that results that BMS has captured
from the reachable public nodes are representative of their entire networks. In
reality, these networks contain nodes that hide behind firewalls and are not vis-
ible to the public. In particular, a fraction of these nodes are part of mining pools,
involving participants that are willing to invest their resources in Bitcoin [129]
or Ethereum networks to generate blocks for the corresponding rewards. Once a
member of such a pool discovers a block, she shares the corresponding rewards
with the other members. The evaluation of miners within such pools is an open
research question.
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Resourceful Nodes. Measuring a network at scale requires measurement
nodes with extensive resources. In particular, measuring the maximum band-
width that Bitcoin and Ethereum nodes have access to require nodes with
(1) high download capacities to ensure that the bottlenecks are not in the mea-
surement apparatus, and (2) sufficient disk capacities to store detailed results.
Since these machines need access to orders of magnitude higher bandwidth
capacity than what is achievable on shared infrastructure, such as PlanetLab
nodes, BMS data was collected using dedicated, well-provisioned beacon nodes
located at Cornell University. We experimentally verified the bandwidth capac-
ity of these nodes by observing the transfer rates of large data chunks trans-
ferred from verified servers in Europe and the US.
Falcon Relay Network. The Falcon Relay Network provided critical data that
is difficult or impossible to collect otherwise. Specifically, Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer
network may mask pruned blocks before some nodes receive them. However,
Bitcoin has also had public relay networks for providing faster block propa-
gation. Miners are motivated to send blocks to these networks, due to a con-
ceivable decrease in their pruned block rate. This incentive enables our relay
network to observe a much larger set of pruned blocks.
5.3 Measurements
In this section, we present comparative measurements of decentralization in
Bitcoin and Ethereum. For each measurement, we describe the methodology,
explore the corresponding challenges, and examine the results.
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5.3.1 Provisioned Bandwidth
Provisioned bandwidth is a lower bound estimate on a node’s transmission ca-
pacity. It typically corresponds to the limits imposed by the last-mile connection
to the Internet. Provisioned bandwidth forms the bottleneck for a peer to re-
ceive/transmit components of the blockchain and the corresponding metadata.
A well-connected miner benefits from greater bandwidth, because it enables her
to propagate/collect blocks to/from the network faster. Malicious miners with
such properties also gain additional advantages [77], because once they discover
competing blocks, they can rapidly propagate their secret blocks to the network
to avoid repercussions.
Methodology
BMS measures the bandwidth of each peer independently in three phases. This
process relies on transfer of data from the remote peer’s blockchain. First, BMS
requests a large amount of data from a peer. Each such request refers to the
same set of (1) blocks in Bitcoin and (2) blocks or the corresponding bodies in
Ethereum. To minimize the possibility of the remote peer not knowing about
the data, requests are limited to blocks that are older than a year. In the sec-
ond phase, BMS divides the time into discrete epochs and records the number
of bytes that it has collected during each one. This process continues until ei-
ther BMS receives all data or a predefined timeout of 30 seconds is reached.
This large timeout conceivably helps BMS (1) extend the data collection period
beyond the TCP slow start phase, which typically involves transfer rates sub-
stantially lower than the usual and (2) minimize the impact of spurious spikes
in throughput over the measurement accuracy. Finally, BMS processes the col-
lected data to determine the provisioned bandwidth. To do so, first, it identifies
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the independent data streams by combining successive epochs containing active
data transfers. Then, to observe a stabilized transfer rate, it eliminates streams
that are shorter than a certain threshold, which is experimentally determined to
be 0.5 seconds. Finally, it presents the highest throughput measurement among
the remaining distinct continuous streams as the provisioned bandwidth of the
remote peer.
Challenges. As with every measurement technique in the real world, the pre-
sented approach is subject to experimental limitations and even expected er-
rors. The accuracy of the measurements may drop under certain circumstances,
including the cases where: (1) the network bottleneck lies on the side of the
measurement beacon rather than the remote peer – i.e. the transmission capac-
ity limit of a remote peer is not determined by its last-mile connection or by a
common link that connects it to other network participants, (2) network traf-
fic on the side of BMS interferes with the collected results, and (3) the remote
peer intentionally shapes the traffic to selectively limit the bandwidth available
to BMS – i.e. bandwidth throttling. The meticulous setup of the bandwidth
infrastructure helps us minimize the potential inaccuracies due to the first two
cases. Moreover, analysis of popular Bitcoin [20] and Ethereum client imple-
mentations [89, 143, 51, 137] shows that the last case is not supported by this
software and would require additional, potentially non-trivial work to set up.
Results
Table 5.2 summarizes per-node bandwidth results that BMS has collected. The
results indicate that Bitcoin nodes in both IPv4 and IPv6 networks have con-
sistently higher bandwidth compared to Ethereum IPv4 nodes. In particular,
typical Bitcoin IPv4 and IPv6 nodes have about 1.9× and 2.7× the bandwidth
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Bitcoin Ethereum
(IPv4) (IPv6) (Tor) (IPv4)
[Mbit/s] [Mbit/s] [Mbit/s] [Mbit/s]
10% 5.7 11.0 2.1 3.4
33% 23.3 45.2 3.1 11.2
50% 56.1 78.2 4.1 29.4
67% 91.1 94.3 5.6 68.3
90% 177.0 207.9 8.1 144.4
Avg. 73.1 86.5 4.7 55.0
Std. Dev. 68.4 66.9 2.4 58.8
Table 5.2: Observed per-node provisioned bandwidth.
Figure 5.2: Provisioned bandwidth (CDF).
of a typical Ethereum IPv4 node, respectively. This high capacity difference be-
tween the networks is also preserved for the average bandwidth. In contrast,
Bitcoin Tor nodes have an order of magnitude lower bandwidth compared to
directly connected nodes, though they are not unusably slow – e.g. 90% has
more than 2 Mbit/s.
Figure 5.2 shows the cumulative distribution of the bandwidth measure-
ments. Steep increases in Bitcoin IPv4/IPv6 curves at around 10 Mbit/s and
100 Mbit/s regions represent typical bandwidth capacities of a home user, and
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a typical Amazon EC2 Bitcoin instance. For Ethereum, we observe a similar
accumulation around 10 Mbit/s region, but the bandwidth is more evenly dis-
tributed over the remaining nodes. As the long tailed distribution and higher
standard deviation indicates, the bandwidth of Bitcoin IPv4/IPv6 nodes are
spread out over a wider range of values compared to Ethereum nodes. While
Bitcoin nodes reach capacities around 300 Mbit/s, the highest Ethereum node
capacity that BMS has observed is limited to 250 Mbit/s.
Overall, the results indicate that a significant fraction of Ethereum and Bit-
coin IPv4/IPv6 nodes have bandwidth capacities beyond typical home users.
90% of the nodes in these networks have provisioned bandwidth over 3.4 to 11.0
Mbit/s. In contrast, even the 90th percentile bandwidth of Tor nodes is around
8.1 Mbit/s. These results show the tradeoff between bandwidth and network
anonymity in cryptocurrency networks. Ongoing research explores alternatives
to Tor network that also provide efficient communication [106].
Shared Node Analysis. Analysis of nodes that BMS has established a con-
nection with let us discover 33 common IPv4 addresses that constitute 0.78% of
Bitcoin and 1.67% of Ethereum nodes. These nodes use the same addresses with
different port numbers. The same IP address indicates the same operator, if not
the same physical machine.
Out of commonly connected nodes, BMS determined the bandwidth of 30
Bitcoin and 9 Ethereum nodes. First, we validated the measurement accuracy
through one-to-one comparison of Bitcoin to Ethereum bandwidth results for
the same addresses. Then, we analyzed why BMS has failed to determine the
bandwidth of 3 Bitcoin and 24 Ethereum nodes. We found that, in Bitcoin, 1 such
node did not respond to BMS’s data requests and the remaining 2 did not send
a continuous data stream for a sufficient period of time to let BMS determine the
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bandwidth. In Ethereum, 20 out of 24 failed nodes instantly disconnected due
to being connected to too many peers. For the remaining nodes, BMS retrieved
either insufficient amount of data or no response to complete the handshake.
The results indicate that the majority of the Ethereum nodes are either (1) al-
ready connected to the maximum number of peers that they are configured
with, or (2) accept connections only from the static and trusted peers. In both
cases, remote clients would instantly disconnect from BMS. Compared to Bit-
coin, Ethereum has a lower default limit on the maximum number of peer con-
nections. In Ethereum, the hard coded default protocol limit is 25, whereas in
the mainline Bitcoin Core client, this limit is 125. This 5× difference would be
one possible explanation of these observations.
Evolution of Provisioned Bandwidth in Bitcoin. One of the most interesting
discoveries of this study is that the Bitcoin network has improved tremendously
in terms of its provisioned bandwidth. The results show that Bitcoin IPv4 nodes,
which used to be connected to the network with a median bandwidth of 33
Mbit/s in 2016 [52], now have a median bandwidth of 56 Mbit/s, as of Febru-
ary 2017. In other words, the provisioned bandwidth of a typical full node is
now 1.7× of what it was in 2016. Considering the fact that over the past year,
Bitcoin IPv4 nodes have consistently accounted for about 80% of known public
full nodes [1], these results shed light on the overall evolution of Bitcoin peers
and the network structure.
The bandwidth of a node is critical in determining system parameters, such
as the maximum block size and block frequency. The increase in provisioned
bandwidth suggests that, for people who were happy with the level of decen-
tralization that Bitcoin exhibited last year, block size or frequency can be in-
creased by the observed improvement factor without impacting their central-
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ization concerns.
5.3.2 Network Latency
The network latency between peers impacts the time to propagate blocks, trans-
actions, and the associated metadata.
Methodology
Single Beacon Latency. Latency between a measurement node and peers in
Bitcoin or Ethereum networks provide a partial network view from the perspec-
tive of a specific source. The distribution of collected latencies enables a node
to pinpoint its relative position in the global network. BMS measures latencies
using minimum network ping times. For repeated measurements, it picks the
minimum observed value.
Geographical Distance. BMS uses geolocation data to estimate the distribu-
tion of Bitcoin and Ethereum nodes on Earth, as well as the impact of distance
on measured latencies. These estimations represent the shortest path between
(1) peers within cryptocurrency networks and (2) the source measurement node
and each peer. To calculate distances, BMS applies the Haversine formula [151]
using the coordinate values gathered from an IP-based geolocation service [97].
Peer-to-Peer Latency. Measuring the exact peer-to-peer latency requires access
to the endpoints. But, BMS bypasses this requirement by providing estimates
based on observed latencies from multiple beacons. First, from a single vantage
point, it measures the latency to each peer. Then it uses the triangle inequality to
estimate upper and lower bounds for the latency between peers. Then it repeats
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the same process from other vantage points. Overall, this process yields a set
of bounds for each pair of peers. Finally, BMS determines a range for latency
estimates between each peer by picking the maximum lower bound and the
minimum upper bound. The chapter presents the estimated mid-range latency
between peers.
In both Bitcoin and Ethereum, peers do not reveal their neighbors. Hiding
the network structure boosts privacy and security [92, 129], but also makes it
harder to infer properties of the network. BMS provides latency estimates for a
superset of the actual links between known peers.
Challenges. Previous studies have shown that triangle inequality violations
are more common than expected in the Internet [118, 176, 165, 174, 33]. Reasons
of such inaccuracies include variations in the routing policies, traffic load, and
measurement errors. Through retrieval of long-term data using multiple van-
tage points, we try to minimize the occurrence of the last two errors. However,
due to inherent routing properties of the Internet, BMS may over- or under-
estimate some latency values. Moreover, BMS cannot collect measurements
from IPv4/IPv6 nodes that block ICMP traffic and from Tor nodes due to their
dependence on TCP. Finally, the external geolocation service might produce in-
accurate estimates. We detect a subset of such cases by crosschecking counter-
intuitive findings – e.g. low ping latency to a large estimated distance.
Results
Single Beacon Latency. The first two columns of Table 5.3 present single bea-
con latency in Bitcoin IPv4/IPv6 networks. The results indicate that both the
median and the average latency to IPv4 nodes are less than IPv6 node laten-
cies. However, comparison of percentiles beyond 67% shows that IPv6 latencies
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Single Beacon Peer-to-Peer
Bitcoin Bitcoin Ethereum
(IPv4) (IPv6) (IPv4) (IPv4)
[ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
10% 29 40 48 92
33% 78 80 79 125
50% 89 95 109 152
67% 98 95 152 200
90% 201 165 286 276
Avg. 97 103 135 171
Std. Dev. 59 62 88 76
Table 5.3: The minimum observed single beacon latencies and peer-to-peer la-
tency estimates.
Figure 5.3: Distribution of latency with increasing distance to nodes measured
from Ithaca, NY.
are smaller. To understand this phenomenon, we examined the relationship be-
tween the latency and distance from the measurement point to remote nodes.
Figure 5.3 illustrates that the majority of IPv6 nodes are located at a
midrange distance, whereas IPv4 nodes show higher accumulation at a closer
proximity. As expected, latencies increase with the distance; hence, these closer
IPv4 nodes make the corresponding latencies smaller for percentiles below 67%.
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Equidistant node latencies in 7K to 8K km range shows that IPv6 nodes are
faster than IPv4 nodes. While such variations might be due to differences in
the underlying routing topologies, no clear trend is observable in other regions.
Note that due to the location of nodes, certain distances from our vantage point
contain fewer data points – e.g. no Bitcoin client in the ocean. Finally, we see
a few (1) IPv6 nodes around 0 km distance, and (2) IPv4 nodes between 12K to
14K km distance with surprisingly low ping times. Crosschecking these nodes
using estimates provided by another geolocation service [120] shows that the
corresponding estimates are indeed due to inaccuracies of the geolocation ser-
vice.
Peer-to-Peer Latency Estimates. Contrary to single beacon latencies, peer-to-
peer latency estimates represent a global overview of the network. Estimates
summarized in the last two columns of Table 5.3 are based on 5.75 million and
9.25 million virtual links in Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, respectively. Peers
use a subset of these links to connect to their neighbors. The results show that
compared to global peer-to-peer latency estimates, measurements from our Bit-
coin IPv4 beacon exhibits lower latency properties. In particular, the median la-
tency from the measurement node is 23% faster than the global peer-to-peer es-
timates. This demonstrates that the geolocation and neighbor selection of peers
have a substantial impact in their performance.
Table 5.3 indicates considerable differences between peer-to-peer latencies
of the Bitcoin and Ethereum IPv4 networks. This difference is particularly no-
ticeable in the lower half of the data set. To examine this region in detail, we
plotted the PDF of the network latencies as shown in Figure 5.4(a). As also indi-
cated by the lower standard deviation, latency values in the Ethereum network
fall within a narrower range. Interestingly, density within this narrow region is
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centered around a 120 ms peak, which comes after the second such peak of Bit-
coin. Maybe the most compelling observation from these latency distributions
is the substantial difference between the two networks regarding the estimated
latencies under 100 ms. The figure shows that while 13% of Ethereum latency
estimations are under this value, in Bitcoin, this ratio is surprisingly high at 46%.
Results indicate a significant divergence within the Bitcoin network, providing
much better latency properties to the half of its platform. Given our previous
observation in Figure 5.3 that the latency tends to increase with distance, an
appropriate question is whether the geographical distribution of peers has any
impact on the observed P2P latencies.
To assess this, we compare Figure 5.4(c), which shows the CDF of peer-to-
peer distances in Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, with the CDF of latencies in
Figure 5.4(b). We found that typically Ethereum nodes are not accumulated in a
single geographical region, but are more evenly distributed around the world.
Compared to Bitcoin, the distance between pingable peers in Ethereum is con-
sistently higher – i.e. 19.4% on average. Hence, we conclude that there is a
strong correlation between the high peer-to-peer latency and more decentral-
ized structure of Ethereum network.
5.3.3 Link Establishment
Churn is an inherent property of peer-to-peer networks [157]. Neudecker et
al. [133] show that in the Bitcoin network, the majority of observed session
lengths are less than 6 hours. In a measurement study, Heilman et al. [92] ob-
serve that 43% of connections persist less than two days. On churn, peers look
for new neighbors to form links. We study the overhead associated with this
process.
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(a) Peer-to-peer latency (Histogram).
(b) Peer-to-peer latency (CDF). (c) Peer-to-peer distance (CDF).
Figure 5.4: Estimates are based on (a)-(b) triangular inequality, and (c) IP-based
geolocation.
Methodology
Establishing the TCP Connection. The standard TCP requires a three-way
handshake to establish a connection. This process enables endpoints to estimate
the round trip time (RTT) before starting data exchange. BMS disables Nagle’s
algorithm and measures the time to establish these connections from a single
vantage point. To ensure that the collected data presumably represent RTT but
not the retransmission timeout, it picks the minimum observed value among
repeated measurements between the same source and destination.
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Bitcoin Ethereum
(IPv4) (IPv6) (Tor) (IPv4)
[ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
10% 28 44 377 27
33% 78 82 627 79
50% 88 95 830 93
67% 99 96 1140 119
90% 204 167 2601 237
Avg. 98 110 1177 131
Std. Dev. 68 112 1040 212
Table 5.4: Observed time to establish TCP connections.
Establishing Protocol-Level Connection. Peers perform a protocol hand-
shake to negotiate the communication rules, set dynamic parameters, or secure
the channel. Depending on the protocol design, a handshake may consist of
a single message exchange as in Bitcoin, or may involve multiple phases as in
Ethereum. While additional phases provide functionalities, such as encryption,
extensibility, and resistance against protocol failures, they also come with per-
formance penalties. To examine this tradeoff, BMS records the minimum times
to complete each handshake phase.
Results
TCP Connection. Table 5.4 summarizes the times to establish TCP connec-
tions. Connection times for Bitcoin IPv4/IPv6 nodes exhibit a similar distribu-
tion to corresponding single beacon latencies in Table 5.3. However, connection
times for Tor nodes are an order of magnitude higher compared to Ethereum
and Bitcoin IPv4/IPv6 due to (1) extra network hops, (2) differential treatment
for Tor traffic [33, 170], and (3) forwarding delays caused by encrypted commu-
nication, swaps between kernel and user-space, and packet queuing. Cumula-
tive distribution of TCP connection times in Figure 5.5 illustrates this significant
difference more clearly. Interestingly, diverging connection times in Ethereum
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Figure 5.5: TCP connection time (CDF).
Bitcoin Ethereum
(IPv4) (IPv6) (Tor) (IPv4)
[ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
10% 32 52 182 34/29/27
33% 80 86 265 93/80/82
50% 93 96 326 129/94/94
67% 114 104 399 175/123/123
90% 228 193 728 322/248/251
Avg. 138 127 462 170/133/151
Std. Dev. 363 280 660 217/220/272
Table 5.5: Handshake times. Ethereum times show Encryption/P2P proto-
col/subprotocol phases.
nodes beyond 60% indicate that Bitcoin IPv4/IPv6 nodes would be less affected
from frequent neighbor changes. This might justify Ethereum’s smaller default
maximum connection limit.
Protocol Handshake. Table 5.5 provides a list of measured handshake times.
The results show that IPv6 handshakes are the fastest and most predictable –
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Figure 5.6: Handshake Time (CDF). PH1–3 indicate encryption, P2P protocol,
and subprotocol handshakes, respectively. Sum indicates the overall handshake
time for Ethereum.
typically in the range of 50 ms to 200 ms. Tor handshakes, by contrast, are
around 3× higher than the others. While this difference can be attributed to Tor
requirements to route the traffic over ≥ 3 relays, surprisingly, the total hand-
shake time of Ethereum nodes have roughly the same magnitude.
Figure 5.6 shows the cumulative distribution of handshake times and phases
of Ethereum handshake. We observe that curves of these handshake phases are
located close to Bitcoin curves. This collocation implies that compared to the
encrypted communication penalty, multiple round trips have a higher impact
on the total Ethereum handshake time.
Overall, we observe that the link establishment in Ethereum incurs higher
delays compared to Bitcoin. This makes the process of connecting to Ethereum
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peers more costly.
5.3.4 Distribution of Mining Power
Mining on cryptocurrency networks is a complex process that typically requires
large computation power. With the current mining difficulty of Bitcoin and
Ethereum, using commodity hardware to generate blocks is not feasible [53].
This leads to commercialization of the mining process by means of centralized
pools and industrial miners, which typically rely on specialized hardware such
as GPU farms or ASICs. Mining pool members represent the same entity.
Methodology
To identify the power of miners in the Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, we ex-
amined their weekly distribution over the last 10 months starting on July 15,
2016. The selection of this start date is based on observed stabilization in the
mining power distribution in both platforms after this time. Factors that con-
tributed to this phenomenon are outside the scope of this work. Our mining
power estimations are based on the ratio of main chain blocks generated by dis-
tinct entities. Hence, pruned blocks in Bitcoin and uncles in Ethereum do not
affect these estimations. In both networks, miners voluntarily provide the iden-
tity information as part of each block they mine. We gathered this data from
a public API for Bitcoin [27] and a blockchain explorer for Ethereum [71]. In
Bitcoin, 1.8% of the blocks were unidentified, which we treated as if they were
generated by distinct individual miners. Finally, we manually processed iden-
tities to detect and merge information of the same miners. This includes pools
operated by the same admin [98] and multiple identities representing the same
pool.
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Challenges. The core assumption that our analysis rests on is that the miners
accurately self-identify themselves. To see why this is the case, let us look at how
miners are involved in the process of adding a feature to the cryptocurrency.
Miners must comply with protocol changes; thus, they often indicate
whether they support a proposed change or not. However, this process is not
well-established – it might be conducted offline as in Ethereum’s DAO hard fork
proposal [145], or on-blockchain as in Bitcoin’s SegWit proposal [116]. For ex-
ample, SegWit requires 95% of the latest 2000 blocks to signal readiness before
activating.
While strong miners gain political clout and attract more members, getting
too large raises alarms among the community about centralization. Thus, such
miners may conceal or obfuscate this information to appear less powerful – e.g.
by generating multiple identities. For instance, two major mining pools, Eth-
pool and Ethermine, publicly reveal that they share the same admin [98]. Thus,
any analysis based on the voluntary miner data tends to skew towards a more
decentralized network than the reality.
Results
For each week of the analysis period, we calculated the corresponding min-
ing power of entities and assigned indices to each miner corresponding to
their rank. Figure 5.7 shows the top 20 weekly mining power distribution in
Ethereum and Bitcoin networks. Each batch of bars represents a chronologically
ordered collection of weekly mining power ratios.
Figure 5.7 illustrates that, in Bitcoin, the weekly mining power of a single
entity has never exceeded 21% of the overall power. Moreover, the top 4 Bitcoin
miners have represented more than 53% of the average power. In contrast, the
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of mining power in Bitcoin and Ethereum networks.
Bars indicate observed standard deviation from the average.
top Ethereum miner has never had less than 21% of the power. This entity has
consistently possessed a higher power ratio compared to Bitcoin. On average,
61% of the weekly power was shared by only 3 Ethereum miners. These obser-
vations signal a more centralized network for Ethereum, making its blockchain
vulnerable to censorship.
Although miners do not necessarily keep their rank over the observation
period, each rank has limited diversity. In particular, only 2 Bitcoin and 3
Ethereum miners ever held the top rank. Interestingly, a mining pool with the
same identity has been the top miner for 29% and 14% of the time in Bitcoin
and Ethereum networks, respectively. Over 50% of the mining power has exclu-
sively been shared by 8 miners in Bitcoin and 5 miners in Ethereum throughout
the observed period. Even the 90th percentile of the mining power seems to be
controlled by only 16 miners in Bitcoin and only 11 miners in Ethereum. Hence,
both platforms provide limited diversity in terms of distinct entities they rely
87
515
25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Ra
tio
 o
f
M
in
in
g 
Po
w
er
 (%
)
Miner Index (Descending Mining Power)
Ethereum
Bitcoin
Figure 5.8: Exponential trendlines fitted to the average distribution of mining
power.
on for maintenance of their main data structure.
Figure 5.8 shows trend lines of mining power as exponential distributions
with curves 0.21e−0.19x and 0.35e−0.3x in Bitcoin and Ethereum, respectively.
These curves fit well to the corresponding average of each rank in Bitcoin and
Ethereum, each yielding a coefficient of determination value of 0.99.
5.3.5 Mining Power Utilization
Mining power utilization [75], which measures the fraction of mined blocks that
remain in the main chain, is a metric for evaluating the efficiency of a protocol,
as well as a second order metric for robustness against rollbacks. As mining
power utilization increases, the protocol is able to convert more of the energy
spent to useful work, and therefore the cost to launch an attack is higher.
Methodology
To study the mining power utilization, we analyzed weekly and daily distri-
bution of pruned blocks in Bitcoin and uncles in Ethereum, compared to the
main chain blocks. We retrieved this data from (1) the Falcon network, (2) a
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Figure 5.9: Weekly mining power utilization (Bitcoin).
local Bitcoin client, and (3) public blockchain explorers for Bitcoin [27] and
Ethereum [71]. In particular, the Bitcoin blockchain explorer and Falcon exclu-
sively provided 12% and 20% of the total 124 pruned blocks, respectively. Both
sources commonly discovered the remaining 68%.
Challenges. The design of Ethereum protocol requires peers to store and prop-
agate a fraction of blocks that are out of the main chain – i.e. uncles. In contrast,
Bitcoin’s blockchain only stores the main chain. Moreover, peers don’t propa-
gate blocks once they identify them as pruned. Hence, capturing such blocks
in Bitcoin requires actively watching the network. While increasing the number
of globally distributed vantage points may boost the detection rate, this discov-
ery process is still best effort. Consequently, our analysis may overestimate the
utilization.
Results
Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10 show weekly and daily distributions of mining power
utilization in Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, respectively. The results show
that Bitcoin utilization is always above 99%, which represents a small wasted
mining effort in this network. In contrast, daily utilization in Ethereum is typi-
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Figure 5.10: Daily mining power utilization (Ethereum).
cally between 90% to 94% range and never goes above the 97% threshold. Dur-
ing 2016, Ethereum faces occasional rapid drops in its utilization down to 74%
to 88% range, including (1) the days following the exploitation of the DAO vul-
nerability from June 17 to June 18, (2) attacks on Ethereum network [168, 31, 159]
between September 22 to October 19, and (3) the days following the Spurious
Dragon hard fork [99] between November 23 to 29. The results indicate a strong
correlation between mining power utilization and real life events in Ethereum.
This correlation conceivably indicates preventive measures that spam the net-
work to slow down the DAO attacker, bad actors generating blocks with exces-
sive resource demands leading to increased validation times, and miners with
outdated clients.
5.3.6 Peer Freshness
Participants in blockchain-based platforms may be censored by delay-
ing/blocking their information retrieval/propagation [87, 92]. Higher decen-
tralization requires that a larger part of the network knows more about the latest
global state. In blockchain- based networks, this state is called the best blockchain.
As updating the local view is not an instantaneous process, a peer might have
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an outdated blockchain. We define a peer as stale if its blockchain height is be-
hind the tip of the best blockchain. Such peers are likely to experience a heavier
network traffic due to the potential bootstrapping process. We study the level
of staleness to examine information diffusion
Methodology
Determination of staleness relies on the comparison of each peer’s local view
with the best blockchain state. For each peer, BMS identifies the level of stale-
ness in three steps. First, it retrieves the height of each peer’s local blockchain
during the protocol handshake. While Bitcoin nodes directly send their height
as part of version messages, Ethereum nodes share the hash of their chain
head. BMS translates Ethereum block hashes to their blockchain heights. Note
that BMS keeps each such measurement with the corresponding retrieval time.
In the second step, for each such retrieval time, BMS (1) identifies the latest block
in the best blockchain, and (2) gathers the corresponding height. Then it marks a
peer as stale if its local height is less than the height of the best blockchain at the
measurement retrieval time. Finally, BMS calculates the level of staleness. This
represents the exact time difference between the measurement retrieval and the
generation of the first unknown block.
Challenges. Preliminary analysis revealed that a fraction of Bitcoin IPv4/IPv6
peers (≤ 0.1%) report a common height that is even higher than the tip of the
best blockchain. We suspect that these nodes are part of a network experiment.
BMS removes such Bitcoin nodes from its analysis.
While Ethereum nodes do not report their height directly, we observed that
24% of the measured nodes announced a head hash that belongs to a block out
of the DAO hard fork chain. This result is not surprising because Ethereum
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Figure 5.11: Distribution of the level of staleness.
nodes accept a conflicting main chain depending on their stance on the DAO
hard fork. However, the divergence in the perceived world views makes it chal-
lenging to analyze the global staleness distribution in the network. As the ma-
jority of the measurements indicated pro hard fork chain heads, BMS focuses its
examination on these peers.
Results
Figure 5.11 illustrates the cumulative distribution of the staleness level in Bitcoin
and Ethereum. The results show significant variations in the ratio of stale nodes
between the two networks. While in Bitcoin 91.6% of IPv4, 98.5% IPv6, and
100% of Tor nodes have completely up-to-date block information, in Ethereum
this ratio remains at 45.8%. The steep increase in the Ethereum curve from 0
to 1 minute indicates a substantial accumulation in this range, which accounts
for 27.5% of all nodes. The same range in Bitcoin IPv4 network contains 4.2%
of all nodes. The long tail of Ethereum curve beyond 1 minute shows that the
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significant staleness gap between the two cryptocurrencies persists.
Ethereum embodies an average block frequency that is an order of magni-
tude higher than Bitcoin. Figure 5.11 indicates that the local blockchain heights
in Ethereum nodes are more smoothly spread out over a wide range. To under-
stand the impact of relative height, we dissected the staleness based on height.
We found out that (1) 2.6% of IPv4 and 1% of IPv6 Bitcoin nodes, and (2) 15.7%
of Ethereum nodes are more than 1% behind the height of the corresponding
best blockchains. Freshness of Tor nodes might indicate that at the time of the
measurements, no Tor node has recently joined the network. Note that, at the
time of our measurements, 1% height corresponds to 29 and to 6 days of stale-
ness in Bitcoin and Ethereum, respectively.
Dissecting Bitcoin’s Stale Nodes. Despite Bitcoin’s comparably small stale-
ness ratio, the high ratio of IPv4 nodes that are more than 1% behind the height
of the best blockchain was unexpected. On February 15, 2017, we performed
a followup study focused on these nodes. Of the 92 stale IPv4 nodes with
these properties, 74 responded to this followup. Of these 74, 62 have the same
height as before – i.e. they do not try to catch up. We suspect that a soft-
ware error is keeping these nodes from making forward progress. 74% of stale
peers that don’t try to catch up use the same agent with sub-version string
"/BTCC:0.13.1/" – i.e. a client from a Chinese Bitcoin exchange/mining
pool.
5.3.7 Fairness
Section 5.3.4 presented the mining power distribution that is correlated with
the main chain presence of miners. However, the impact of this distribution
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Figure 5.12: Distribution of fairness. Missing bars indicate absence of observed
pruned blocks.
on a miner’s pruned block generation is not clear. To study this relationship,
we define and examine fairness as the ratio of (1) a miner’s share of pruned
blocks to (2) her mining power. In a fair protocol, miners generate pruned blocks
proportional to their mining power; hence, the fairness is close to 1.
Methodology
We used the Falcon network, and a Bitcoin blockchain explorer [25] to retrieve
pruned Bitcoin blocks. These sources have, respectively, provided 109 and 99
blocks, yielding a total of 124 distinct pruned blocks. We collected uncles from
an Ethereum blockchain explorer [71].
Challenges. Our analysis assumes that miners voluntarily identify themselves
in uncles/pruned blocks. Identification process for such blocks is unlikely to be
biased differently, because miners do not know if their blocks will make it to
the main chain or not. Moreover, we also assume that the collected dataset is
representative of all pruned Bitcoin blocks. We suspect that explicit storage of
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uncles in the blockchain of Ethereum lets us obtain a more accurate analysis on
it.
Results
Figure 5.12 shows the distribution of fairness of 20 miners with the highest min-
ing power. The results indicate that, in both networks, the top 4 miners incorpo-
rate a higher ratio of blocks into the main chain compared to their uncle/pruned
block ratio. While Bitcoin fairness shows a high variance between 0 and 6.93,
Ethereum has a more stable distribution in the range of 0.69 to 1.55. In particu-
lar, high fairness over smaller Bitcoin miners means more revenue loss for them.
In contrast, Ethereum network demonstrates a substantial overall fairness with
an average of 1.08.
5.4 Conclusion
The extent of decentralization in blockchain-based platforms is critical in at-
tracting people to these systems. As the size of the user base or the frequency of
using blockchain services increase, the corresponding workloads tend to grow,
requiring better peak throughput and latency. However, a scaling solution that
fulfills these requirements may induce centralization, which undermines the
core feature of blockchains. Thus, having a quantitative knowledge of a sys-
tem’s decentralization enables a principled way of assessing the applicability of
different scaling solutions.
This chapter presents a comparative assessment of decentralization in two
most popular cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum. To do so, it relies on mea-
surements from actual networks, monitoring through Falcon relay network, and
static blockchain analysis. In particular, our observations show that Bitcoin pro-
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vides a network with higher resource capacity, less overhead under high churn,
more diverse mining power distribution, and greater resistance to censorship.
Whereas, Ethereum achieves better fairness in miner revenue, and provides less
network-link-latency divergence within its infrastructure.
Despite their different level of decentralization, our analysis reveals that
both Bitcoin and Ethereum have room for improvement in their protocol and
infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 6
RELATED WORK
Blockchain technology emerged in 2008 as the infrastructure of a decentral-
ized cryptocurrency, called Bitcoin, but research on cryptocurrencies dates back
to early 1980s. Chaum introduced blind signatures [37] and described their use
in providing untraceable payments with double-spend prevention in a central-
ized setting. Following work [38] removed the requirement for the bank to be
online at the purchase time, but still needed a central authority. A major mech-
anism towards decentralized cryptocurrencies, proof of work, was introduced by
Dwork and Naor [62] for deterring spam emails. MicroMint [147] described
the use of this mechanism in minting coins for a micropayment system. Hash-
cash [10] reinvented the core idea previously discovered by Dwork and Naor,
adopting it to use a more efficient hash-based scheme instead of RSA. Aspnes
et al. [6] examined the use of continuous proof of work puzzles to deter Sybil
attacks [60]. Karma [164] was the first implemented currency to employ proof
of work to mint coins. Bitcoin, however, integrated proof of work into the core
consensus protocol, yielding the first open-participation microcurrency system
that can tolerate Byzantine participants.
In this chapter, we review past work on scaling blockchains while retaining
their decentralization.
6.1 Scaling Blockchains
This section presents previous work on scaling blockchains, including the ones
that explore scalability with increasing number of services.
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6.1.1 Customizing the Chain Selection Rule
Nakamoto consensus suffers from pruned blocks under high contention, and
wastes effort. The GHOST protocol of Sompolinsky et al. [153] is an attempt
to resolve this issue by changing Bitcoin’s chain selection rule. This rule speci-
fies the branch that participants should pick as the extension of the main chain.
While, in Bitcoin, the chain with the most work (accumulated over all chain
blocks, based on their proofs of work) is the main chain, with GHOST, at a fork,
a node chooses the side whose sub-tree contains more work (accumulated over
all sub-tree blocks). The benefit is that the heaviest sub-tree choice takes into
account proof of work that does not end up in the main chain. Thus, GHOST
improves both fairness and the mining power utilization (see Section 3.4) under
high contention.
To use GHOST in an operational system, a challenge remains. In protocols
that use Bitcoin’s chain selection rule, at any given time, at least one node knows
what the main chain is since it knows all of its blocks. In GHOST, this is not the
case, and it is possible that no single node has enough information to determine
which is the main chain. Figure 6.1 illustrates an example of this case with three
nodes, 1, 2, and 3, each of which is aware of only a subset of the blocks. Each
node knows a chain with a length of height 4, and each knows of a branch of
height 3 starting at a block 2′ and ending at either block 3′, 3′′, or 3′′′, as shown
in Figures 6.1(a), 6.1(b), and 6.1(c), respectively.
One solution to finding the true main chain in GHOST is to propagate all
blocks, or all block headers [153]. However, this exposes the system to denial-
of-service attacks, as a malicious node can overwhelm the network with low-
difficulty blocks. There may be heuristics to avoid the security danger; we
do not address this question, but have evaluated the system by implement-
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Figure 6.1: A partial view of the GHOST block tree by node 1 (a), node 2 (b),
and node 3 (c) does not allow either of them to surmise which is the main chain.
ing it, propagating all blocks. Under these conditions, GHOST performs worse
than Bitcoin as the overhead of propagating all blocks outweighs the benefits
of the chain selection rule. Nevertheless, a practical implementation of GHOST,
overcoming remaining challenges, can be used to complement Bitcoin-NG (see
Chapter 3) and allow for a higher frequency of key blocks.
6.1.2 Off-chain Protocols
An alternative to improving the peak bandwidth and latency of the blockchain
is to perform transactions off the chain. This basic premise apparently origi-
nated in Hearn and Spilman’s two-point channel protocol [91]. The Lightning
network [141] and duplex micropayment channels [55] allow for payment net-
works layered on top of a blockchain. More recent work, Teechan [112], lever-
ages trusted execution environments to secure payment channels, without re-
quiring changes in the underlying on-chain protocol.
The security and privacy guarantees of off-chain payment networks differ
from those of Bitcoin; as an extreme example, if the nodes performing trans-
actions over a channel crash, all their transactions are lost, as they were never
stored in the blockchain. Moreover, the efficacy of such solutions depends on
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properties of the emergent payment network, its topology, the amount of value
locked in payment channels, as well as the protocol’s ability to discover and use
payment paths. Overall, these solutions may be suitable for targeted use cases
where the additional layer may reduce the number of transactions seen at the
lower layers, but, unlike on-chain protocols, they do not address the fundamen-
tal problem of scaling a Nakamoto-consensus RSM.
6.1.3 Relay Networks
Relay networks increase network efficiency through faster block propagation.
Corallo has built the first such system [47], which provides a centralized fast
relay for Bitcoin, parallel to the standard peer-to-peer network. This system
significantly improves network throughput and latency by avoiding full block
verification and retransmission of transactions already known to peers. Con-
trary to store-compress-and-forward architecture in this system, Falcon [13],
another relay network for Bitcoin, relies on cut-through routing for faster block
propagation. Finally, FIBRE [49] incorporates cut-through routing with compact
blocks [48] and forward error correction over UDP. Despite their performance
benefits, relay networks increase centralized control and reduces fairness —
miners outside the fast relay are at a disadvantage.
6.1.4 Multiple Services in Bitcoin’s Blockchain
Bitcoin permits storage of arbitrary data on its blockchain using OP_RETURN
transactions [24]. While there is no format requirement for the data, the size
limit (currently 80 bytes) usually enforces users to store only a hash of their
original content on the blockchain, which they externally validate [46, 135]. This
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limitation imposes a critical tradeoff between data growth management and the
diversity of services.
Users download and process the full history to validate the state of the ex-
isting blockchain protocols [131, 75, 66]. Using commodity hardware, this boot-
strapping process takes many hours in Bitcoin [52]. Such protocols force users
to handle the complexity of irrelevant services. Therefore, a monolithic history
is not a viable option for scaling blockchains with multiple services.
6.1.5 Federated Chains
Another proposition for improving scalability with increasing blockchain ser-
vices is that of federated chains. Sidechains [11] enable users to create transac-
tions that can move coins from one blockchain to another; hence, they provide
extensibility, as different chains can offer different services. However, this leads
to fragmentation of the hash power into distinct blockchains. A compromised
sidechain makes the main chain and the other sidechains vulnerable. Moreover,
when the payor has funds on one sidechain and the payee would like to spend
them on another, the funds have to cross the main chain in order to get the
value to their intended destination. Such transfers across sidechains bloat the
main chain. Finally, their contribution for efficiency is limited, because they in-
cur high latencies for crossing chains to guarantee that funds will not be pruned
from the corresponding chains. Drivechain [160] attempts to minimize the im-
pact of sidechains on the main chain regarding the required knowledge and
effort to prove validity of transfers. However, this approach does not address
inherent limitations regarding the security of sidechains.
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6.1.6 Outsourcing the Security
Services with distinct blockchains attempt to improve their security with
merged mining [21] and anchoring.
In merged mining, a blockchain with insufficient mining power accepts
proof of work submissions from a designated parent chain. This approach raises
three issues. First, if a miner is already part of the parent blockchain, she can use
her mining power to attack the merged-mined blockchain at no cost. Second, a
merged-mined blockchain becomes dependent on its parent chain, making it
fragile with respect to changes in the parent’s security. Finally, it is non-trivial
to maintain the miner coordination across blockchains. Ali et al. [2] show that
even the largest merged-mined cryptocurrency, NameCoin [115], suffers from a
single merged mining pool whose mining power exceeds the 51% threshold.
Anchoring relies on periodically submitting the cumulative hash of all data,
such as the root of a Merkle tree, to a trusted publishing medium, such as the
blockchain of Bitcoin. Anchoring bloats the external blockchain and becomes
dependent on its security.
6.1.7 Service-Agnostic Sharding
A possible technique for improving the scalability of blockchains is to shard
them – i.e. distribute their contents across nodes in their corresponding net-
works. Sharding promises to improve the throughput and reduce per-node
processing, storage, and bandwidth requirements.
Elastico is a service-agnostic protocol for sharding blockchains [119]. This
approach assigns miners to committees for serializing transactions using a clas-
sical Byzantine consensus protocol. As in anchoring (see Section 6.1.6), a final
committee creates a cumulative digest based on all shards and broadcasts it to
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the network. However, to prevent double spends, Elastico requires splitting up
the payment functionality into as many sub-services as the number of shards,
which effectively means as many cryptocurrencies.
Treechains [163] is a sharding idea based on restructuring a blockchain into
a tree of blocks, where each output has a dedicated branch to spend. However,
this proposal is at an early stage with no prototype or a detailed technical anal-
ysis.
6.1.8 Customizing the Blockchain Structure
Lewenberg et al. [111] replace the blockchain structure with a directed acyclic
graph. There still is a main chain, but its blocks may refer to pruned branches
to include their transactions. Analysis demonstrates considerable improvement
of fairness and mining power utilization.
ByzCoin [102] is a blockchain protocol that combines proof of work mech-
anism with PBFT [35]. The corresponding blockchain consists of two interde-
pendent subchains. Using these subchains, the protocol decouples transaction
serialization from block mining – an approach inspired by Bitcoin-NG [75].
Bitcoin-NG (see Chapter 3) achieves optimal fairness and mining power uti-
lization. Using Bitcoin-NG with an inclusive blockchain to increase key block
frequency may prove problematic: Decommissioned leaders could retroactively
introduce transactions and have them included by the current leader. This could
allow for DoS and double-spending attacks.
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6.1.9 Analysis
Given a cryptopuzzle difficulty and a topology, Sompolinsky et al. [154] calcu-
late upper and lower bounds for the growth rate of the Bitcoin main chain. This
analysis can be translated to the expected forking frequency at different diffi-
culty levels when there are exactly two miners. Our experiments target a larger
number of miners, modeled according to Bitcoin’s operational system, that tune
difficulty arbitrarily to reach a target main chain extension rate.
Miller and Jansen [127] describe a methodology for evaluating a large-scale
Bitcoin blockchain system on a single machine using an event-driven simula-
tor. To facilitate manageable experiment times, they replace time-consuming
cryptographic operations with a delay of an appropriate length.
6.1.10 Faster Bitcoin
Significant effort by Bitcoin’s core developers is put into improving the perfor-
mance of the Bitcoin client and technical aspects of its protocol. While this work
can provide significant improvement and enable better scaling, it does not elim-
inate the inherent limitation that stems from forks forming at high rates.
Stathakopoulou et al. suggest reducing propagation delay in the Bitcoin net-
work [155]. However, their suggestions imply significant compromises on secu-
rity. First, they have nodes propagate transaction inventories before they know
the actual transactions in each inventory; this allows an attacker to swamp the
network at no cost by publishing transaction IDs for non-existent transactions.
Second, they form a network by having nodes prefer connections with close
neighbors — exactly the opposite of the current security-oriented algorithm.
Improving the efficiency of the client [3, 139, 162] can improve propagation
time and reduce the collision window (time before A hears B found a block).
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However, the improvement is limited — a processing speed increase of x% (e.g.,
x = 200% with [162]) allows for block size increase of x% at the same fork rate.
6.2 Retaining Decentralization
This section presents existing work on decentralization of blockchain-based
platforms, approaches to improve decentralization, and existing sources that
provide useful data to interpret decentralization of operational systems.
6.2.1 Centralization in Operational Systems
Network measurements in blockchain-based systems have mainly focused on
Bitcoin. One such study [54] demonstrated that the latency is the dominating
factor in propagation of blocks smaller than 20 KB. Following work [52] has
shown that (1) this limit has increased to 80 KB and (2) nodes are provisioned
with substantially higher bandwidth capacity than what the protocol demands.
Feld et al. [78] pointed out a strong AS-level centralization that may impact
Bitcoin network’s connectivity – i.e. 10 ASes contain over 30% of peers. Recent
work [4] presented the level of vulnerability, showing that 13 ASes cover the
same fraction of peers, but only 39 IP prefixes host half of the overall mining
power.
Other work studied various aspects of the Bitcoin overlay network. Miller
et al. [129] found that a small fraction of the network, containing around 100
nodes, represents more than 75% of the mining power. The study conjectured
that these nodes are well-connected to major mining pools; hence, provide
higher efficiency in broadcasting blocks. Biryukov et al. [19] examined peer
neighbors to find out IP addresses that correspond to pseudonymous identities.
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Another study [104] deanonymized peers by observing anomalous relaying be-
havior in network. Pappalardo et al. [136] observed that low value transactions
may experience waits over a month before being incorporated into blockchain.
Other work measured churn and geolocated peers [59]. Gervais et al. [85] dis-
cussed centralization concerns regarding the client development process, distri-
bution of mining power, and spendable coins.
6.2.2 Incentives
Incentive compatibility has been a key issue in the investigation of cryptocur-
rencies and in maintaining their decentralized nature. Babaioff et al. [9] suggest
a mechanism to motivate transaction propagation. Lewenberg et al. [110] pro-
pose an alternative to the chain structure to motivate the participation of badly-
connected miners. Eyal [73] shows that a natural incentive system deters the
formation of large open mining pools.
6.2.3 Resource Requirements for System Participation
Recent work presented ways to reduce resource requirements to participate in
blockchain systems. These solutions enhance decentralization by increasing the
diversity of participants. One such approach [146] relies on authenticated data
structures to reduce the load on nodes. Aspen [84] (see Chapter 4) achieves this
through sharding the blockchain. In this system, users store, process, and prop-
agate only the data that is relevant to them; hence, need much less resources to
join the network.
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6.2.4 Blockchain Explorers
Blockchain explorers constitute a valuable data source in assessment of the ex-
tent of decentralization in existing systems. Such services [156, 25, 71, 72] pro-
vide a variety of information on cryptocurrency networks, including (1) online
blockchain history, (2) statistics on blockchain components, transaction fees, and
market value, and (3) node information.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Scaling blockchains is a multifaceted challenge. First and foremost, increas-
ing adoption of blockchains for demanding services spurs the need for solutions
that can achieve a target throughput and latency as the frequency and volume of
interactions grow. Moreover, the proliferation of blockchain services entails the
exploration of specialized techniques for scaling with growing number of ser-
vices. Finally, assessing the viability of scaling solutions requires understanding
the level of decentralization they can achieve in operational systems and custom
metrics for evaluating them. In this dissertation, we broadly investigate how to
improve the scalability of blockchains while preserving their decentralized na-
ture.
To improve on-chain scalability, we introduce two blockchain protocols. The
first protocol, Bitcoin-NG, shows that high scale can be achieved by separation
of duties. In particular, it employs this concept to reassign the roles that are
implicitly combined in a single block to new blocks, decoupling the process
of block mining from transaction serialization. Bitcoin-NG achieves significant
higher throughput and lower latency compared to Bitcoin, without leveraging
Bitcoin’s trust assumptions. The second protocol, Aspen, complements the first
one, providing additional scalability in the presence of growing number of ser-
vices commingled in a blockchain. This protocol exploits the fact that differ-
ent participants have different expectations; hence, to achieve high scale, it em-
ploys a novel technique that distributes the overall complexity and resource cost
among users based on their use cases. Critically, this technique, called service-
oriented sharding, provides greater resilience against attacks by keeping the total
mining power that secures all such use cases combined – i.e. unfragmented.
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Furthermore, service-oriented sharding is applicable to the existing blockchain
protocols.
To enable a principled way of evaluating blockchain protocols, we develop
five specialized metrics for consensus protocols. These are the first and only
dedicated metrics for blockchain protocols, and they are crucial for moving the
debate over potential protocol modifications to a scientific, quantitative foun-
dation. Using these metrics, we demonstrate quantitative scalability improve-
ments that Bitcoin-NG achieves in a large scale emulation testbed. To make
this testbed realistic, we calibrate it using our measurements from the Bitcoin
network, and validate it against known network properties from the literature.
Finally, we perform evaluations based on different scenarios and constraints
from the real world. This includes reflecting the varying power of miners in our
testbed.
To enrich the understanding provided by the custom metrics to evaluate
blockchain protocols, we design, implement, and deploy tools and techniques
for the assessment of decentralization in operational blockchain systems. In par-
ticular, we perform a comparative assessment of the extent of decentralization
in Bitcoin and Ethereum. This assessment constitutes the first global-scale em-
pirical study of decentralization in blockchain-based networks. Based on our
observations, we offer concrete suggestions for potential protocol and infras-
tructure improvements in both systems.
Scalability of blockchain technologies is closely tied to the ability of the cor-
responding systems to evolve. This evolution usually involves changes in the
protocol, infrastructure, or targeted use cases of the existing platforms. Con-
trary to fresh systems built to instantiate scaling solutions, existing platforms
that adopt new proposals typically benefit from a large user base and strong se-
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curity guarantees due to their available mining ecosystem. However, conflicts
of interests in existing platforms tend to make the dispute resolution process
more challenging.
While this dissertation provides scaling solutions and how to scientifically
quantify their viability, it does not explore the governing structure of existing
blockchain platforms that manage the adoption of proposals. We believe that
an ideal process should be in line with the decentralized nature of blockchains:
involving distinct entities in decision making, enabling open discussions with
honest feedback, and providing clear roadmaps.
Scaling blockchains while keeping their decentralized essence is necessary
for a full appreciation of their potential. Providing services with performance
comparable to mainstream technologies, support for novel applications, and
sustaining the workload generated by growing user base all depend on suc-
cessful instantiation of scalability solutions. Our contributions present a step
towards addressing these challenges.
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